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Address 
By ALEXANDER G. RUTHV EN 
President of the University of Michigan 
WE HAVE met here today specifically to dedicate Hutchins Hall, the last unit to be erected of a splendid group of buildings presented to the University by Mr. W. W. 
Cook. The buildings are beautiful, useful, and enduring, but taken alto­
gether, with all that they are in themselves and all that they signify, they 
represent only one part of a comprehensive contribution to the educa­
tional resources of the University of Michigan. It is, therefore, both 
fitting and imperative that we should on this occasion consider carefully 
the significance of our whole heritage. 
Other persons today will speak of Mr. Cook's generosity, of his 
interest in education, of his loyalty to his University, of his public 
spirit, and of his regard and respect for the law. Undoubtedly these 
attributes were contributing factors in his decision to erect these build­
ings and to provide an endowment for Legal Research. But, it is my 
purpose to discuss the deeper significance of his splendid gift. 
A benefaction to an educational institution is generally a joint one. 
The gift often bears the name of the partner who provides the capital, 
and the silent partners are those faculty members, past and present, 
whose ability and faithfulness have developed the school, department, or 
project to the point where it challenges the interest, and is worthy of the 
support, of the donor. It is eminently fitting that the University should, 
in part, recognize the faculty's contribution to the gift of Mr. Cook by 
giving to the classroom building the name of that honored alumnus, 
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professor, dean, and president, Harry B. Hutchins, who dreamed with 
the benefactor the vision which has now materialized. 
Benefactors and faculties alike understand that the recognition of such 
a partnership in giving to education in no way lessens the gratitude due 
to donors by a thoughtful public. On the whole, it should increase 
respect for the giver since it connotes intelligence and thought, rather 
than sentimentality or ignorance, in giving. We are correctly informed 
that "He gives not best who gives most; but he gives most who gives 
b " est. 
The responsibility of the silent partners, present and future, in an 
enterprise of this kind is clear cut. Their duty is to carry on in the tradi­
tions of their predecessors. They must spare no pains to justify the 
investment by increasingly better results in teaching, research, and 
service. In this way, and in this way only, can they perpetuate the gift 
and properly immortalize the donor. 
Mr. Cook did not care for notoriety; he was not moved to assist the 
University solely by a sentimental attachment to the institution; and he 
was not ambitious to establish a monument for himself. Clearly his was 
a deep and intelligent appreciation of the aims of education and of the 
results and needs of his school in its efforts to advance his beloved pro­
fession. Above all, he had faith in the wisdom and integrity of the 
Regents, in the ability and ideals of the faculty, and in the sincerity of 
the students of the University of Michigan. Knowing his principal part­
ners in this enterprise, -the Law School faculty and the University 
staff, -without fear and without reservation I, as the official represent­
ative of the University, pledge to Mr. Cook's memory wholehearted 
support of his noble ambitions and fidelity to the trust which he has 
imposed upon his Alma Mater. 
The Law School 
Accepts the Responsibility 
By HENRY M. B ATES 
Tappan Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School1 University of Michigan 
N INE years ago this week, with simple but appropriate exer­cises, the first buildings of the Law Quadrangle were formally declared devoted to the splendid purposes of our benefactor, 
William W. Cook. On that day the late James Parker Hall, then Dean of 
the University of Chicago Law School, said in his address: 
"As we dedicate today the Lawyers' Club, the initial realization of 
that beautiful quadrangle of law whose remaining buildings will soon 
take shape, we stand on the threshold of a fine and worthy adventure for 
the betterment of our ancient profession. The temple reared by human 
hands is before us. It remains for it to be possessed by the spirit of human 
service for which these cloisters are a fitting habitation. Into it will be 
poured the labors of devoted teachers and scholars, the efforts of stu­
dents, the support of alumni, and the co-operation of the profession; 
and out of it will come, in the fullness of time, an influence that will 
work mightily for the improvement of our law and its administration in 
the state and in the nation. Its mission will be conceived in no narrow 
spirit. It will teach students. It will train scholars. It will hold up high 
ideals for the profession. It will inspire and help other schools to follow 
its example. And above all it will labor to simplify and clarify the law, to 
fashion it to our changing needs, and to keep it the flexible instrument of 
social progress that is the difficult and crowning achievement of human 
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institutions. To no purpose less high and noble can this beautiful gift be 
dedicated. " 
These words of a high-minded and generous-hearted friend are so 
eloquent of the aspirations and purposes of those of us who are espe­
cially charged with the task of breathing life and spirit into the noble 
housing of the School which Mr. Cook has made possible for us, that I 
can do no better than to quote them, as expressive of the thoughts and 
purposes which crowd upon us on this significant day in the history of 
our Law School. 
A great gift creates obligation on the part of the beneficiaries. Rich 
opportunity has its inescapable correlative, the duty to strive for the 
richest and fullest realization of the opportunity. Conventional and trite 
though these reflections may be, I should fail to express the dominating 
thought and purpose of the University in general, and of the Law School 
especially, if I refrained from giving expression to them. For, in deep 
appreciation of the munificence of the gift, and recognizing the respon­
sibility which it puts upon us, we have studied every possibility of 
utilizing this beautiful group of buildings, and the equally important 
endowment which accompanies it. We have been, and are, thinking and 
planning that we may do our share in attaining the purposes which 
motivated Mr. Cook in his great benefaction-purposes which we 
share fully and unreservedly with him. 
What are the great objectives to which Mr. Cook hoped to contribute? 
Fortunately, in clear and forceful language, he has declared them in his 
deeds of gift and in his will, and some of these words are graven in the 
very structure of the beautiful buildings which he has given. In the 
letter from him which was read at the exercises held here nine years ago 
he said of the legal profession: 
"There are few who tread its hot and dusty highway from end to end, 
but those few mould public opinion instead of following it. But as an 
FROM LEFT TO RIGHT: HENRY M. BATES, TAPPAN PROFESSOR OF LAW AND DEAN OF THE 
LAW SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN. MARVIN B. ROSENBERRY, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN. ROSCOE POUND, CARTER PROFESSOR OF JURISPRUDENCE 
AND DEAN OF THE FACULTY OF LAW IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY. HARLAN F. STONE, ASSO­
CIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. NEWTON D. BAKER, OF 
THE CLEVELAND BAR, SECRETARY OF WAR 1916-1921. 
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'intellectual aristocracy', it has not always led the way towards higher 
standards of living. It is competent to do so and hence I do not think I 
exaggerate when I say that the law schools are of supreme importance in 
this respect to the future institutions, beliefs and conduct of life in 
America. '' 
And he closed his dynamic message in these words: 
"Can your Law School be made a great center of legal education and 
of jurisprudence for the good of the public? I believe it can and in that 
belief shall press on. " 
In his will occurs this significant passage, which elaborates the epit­
omized statement just read and affords striking proof that his gift was 
inspired by no mere institutional pride or limited by parochial or pro­
vincial or class vision and aspiration: 
"Believing as I do that American institutions are of more consequence 
than the wealth or power of the country; and believing that the preserva­
tion and development of these institutions have been, are, and will con­
tinue to be under the leadership of the legal profession; and believing 
also that the future of America depends largely on that profession; and 
believing that the character of the law schools determines the char­
acter of the legal profession, I wish to aid in enlarging the scope and im­
proving the standards of the law schools by aiding the one from which 
I graduated, nat�ely the Law School of the University of Michigan. " 
It was this breadth of view, this recognition that law is but a means to 
great ends, this generous desire to contribute to the welfare of all classes 
in the nation, that commanded the immediate, profound and enduring 
sympathy and determination of the law faculty. 
It is possible to believe that Mr. Cook exaggerated the power and 
influence of the American Bar, but there are those of us who know, from 
intimate conversations with him, that he was deeply conscious of its 
defects and its failures, and it must be remembered that he was addressing 
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his words to lawyers and making his gift to them as at once a stimulus 
and an aid to the realization of the sound ideals of the professipn. And 
he could not have made his gift at a more opportune time in American 
history, for who can doubt that today America is struggling desperately 
and confusedly in a period more critical than that of which John Fiske 
wrote. The years stretching from the winning of our national inde­
pendence to the establishment of the national government, under the 
Constitution, though desperate indeed, were characterized by dangers 
and difficulties which seem relatively simple, if not superficial, as com­
pared with the baffling and fundamental problems of our day. It was a 
question then as to whether government could command the financial 
and other support necessary for effective life, whether the states could 
be kept in union, whether they could be restrained from opposing and 
weakening each other, in their insensate industrial and trade rivalries. 
But after all, the true path was fairly clear to the leaders of that day, and 
the task was chiefly to surmount known difficulties and to harmonize 
differences of political and economic interests, which did not reach down 
into the depths or fundamentals of life. 
We were beset then with the rivalries of the relatively small states of 
one nation, with a population which after all was homogeneous through­
out and for the most part shared somewhat the same set of rather 
definite opinions and desires. Today we find ourselves engaged in the 
gigantic and bitter international conflicts of a world which seems to have 
lost its way, paralyzed by befogging doubts, and blinded by political and 
trade rivalries. More presaging of disaster than commercial or political 
antagonisms is the fact that we seem to have lost faith in those ideas of 
government, of religion and of ethics, which for centuries, whether 
right or wrong, have exercised a stabilizing influence and have given 
direction and some sense of security in our national life. 
The uncertainties and clashing opinions concerning such important 
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institutions and standards as these are characteristic of periods of acute 
transition. They are, in fact, an inevitable product of changing condi­
tions. What these changes are is well known. Doubtless they are being 
recited upon a thousand Commencement platforms, this month. Suffice 
it to say here that they are fundamental, in some respects revolutionary, 
and far-reaching beyond anything in modern history. Law is a resultant 
of the industry, commerce and thinking-in short, of the life-of the 
community. It has, of course, its reciprocal influence upon that life, but 
it is no longer thought of as an unyielding mold to which life must be 
forced to conform. If this be so, one has only to compare the national 
industry, commerce, transportation and beliefs of 1789 with those of 
today, to realize that unless adjustments had been made in our legal 
order it could not have survived. 
Furthermore, it follows that the process of modification must be con­
tinuous, and that in a period of acute transition like this, modification 
must take place with comparative rapidity. Without such modification 
the national life would be partially frustrated, if not disrupted. Fortu­
nately, neither the temper nor the habit of the American people is con­
ducive to violent and sudden change, in matters of fundamental impor­
tance. But reliance upon habit and a supposed temper, in these matters, 
must not be pressed too far. We must set about making necessary 
changes as intelligently and as scientifically as possible. It is this situation 
which makes Mr. Cook's gift so timely, and which offers to the law 
schools of the country extraordinary opportunity for service to our 
national life. 
How great that opportunity is may be indicated by reference to a few 
American institutions which are undergoing great strain and stress, and 
which many fear are disintegrating to a degree menacing to the future of 
the republic. First, let us consider for a moment the unquestionably 
changed attitude among our people toward law in general and especially 
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toward what is sometimes called distributive justice, and the function of 
the courts in its administration. For approximately a century after the 
adoption of the Federal Constitution American law remained relatively 
static. It was assumed to be based upon fundamental and immutable 
principles, and that it was the duty of the courts only to declare the law 
in relation to cases pending before them. The country was blessed with 
a few masterful judges and legal scholars, such as Marshall, Kent, Story, 
Calhoun, Webster and Cooley. But courts, for the most part, applied 
precedent somewhat slavishly, and law was studied and taught dog­
matically. Then toward the end of the last century dynamic changes in 
the life of the nation had begun to influence our thinking and treatment 
of law. Mr. Justice Holmes and Dean Pound were the influential leaders 
who aroused the country, and particularly the Bar, to a fresh and more 
philosophical, and at the same time a more realistic, attitude toward law 
and its administration. Generative seeds sown by these and other men 
have produced a most healthful ferment in the realm of legal scholarship. 
But contemporary scholars are by no means all moving along the same 
paths. At least two divergent, if not opposed, movements or tendencies 
are observable. One may be said to be a priori and conceptual in character, 
while the other has been dubbed realist or functional. 
In some of the jurisprudential writing of the day the differences 
between these movements has been greatly exaggerated. In retrospect, at 
least, it will be seen that the divergencies are, for the most part, those 
of degree and emphasis. Law never has been and never should be based 
wholly upon a priori assumptions, on the one hand, or upon a merely 
pragmatic philosophy, on the other. Whether there be immutable prin­
ciples of justice or not, every national society has its beliefs, its standards 
and traditions, which must and should have a large controlling influence. 
Principle cannot be thrown out of the window without ensuing anarchy. 
One has only to examine the earlier reported cases in early English 
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jurisprudence to realize that in the days of the Year Books, as now, 
principle and fact, in the large sense, have combined to fashion our law. 
But there have been periods in which principle, embalmed and crystal­
lized in authority and precedents, has become devitalized. 
But in this year of grace, principle is being revitalized and made con­
formative to the life of our day. Facts are having their innings, and by 
facts, of course, are meant not the mere petty and particular details of 
litigated cases, but the whole factual background and environment. And 
so it is that legal scholars are investigating the actual functioning of the 
nation's industrial and commercial life, and are seeking pertinent infor­
mation to be found in the various social sciences, particularly, in the 
hope of arriving at a just appraisal of our existing legal order and of 
modifying and improving it, if and when desirable. But the difficulties 
and pitfalls in these pursuits are great and numerous. Many a beautiful 
prospect of correcting the existing scheme of justice, already has been 
found to be but a delusion, issuing out of a quagmire of jumbled and 
uninterpreted facts. 
Nevertheless, unquestionably our law, like all other human institu­
tions, needs correction in many respects. Readjustment to the life and 
purposes of our time must be accomplished if we are to achieve a better 
life. Here is a great and unlimited field for the legal scholar. He, better 
than anyone else, is equipped to work toward that blend of principle, 
authority, and conformity to the constantly changing life of any vital 
people, necessary to an effective and prosperous society. 
Other basic questions which offer great opportunities for study are 
the three fundamental features of our Constitution. These may be said 
to be, first, the division of governmental powers between the United 
States as a Federal Union, and the several states; second, the distribution 
of the powers of government, both Federal and state, into legislative, 
executive, and judicial departments; third, the exercise by our courts of 
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the power of review of legislation for the purpose of determining its 
constitutionality. All three of these constitutional arrangements are being 
subjected to tremendous strain. Indeed, there are many who feel that the 
first two of those organic provisions have been undermined and partially 
nullified, and as to the third, organized and determined efforts are being 
made materially to restrict, or wholly to destroy, the power of judicial 
review of legislation. 
It must be apparent that material alteration of those three fundamental 
arrangements of our constitutional law would vitally affect our entire 
national structure and life. It is equally apparent that, to the extent to 
which such changes are likely to be made, we should proceed with ex­
treme care and should fashion the changes in the manner, and to the 
extent, indicated by comprehensive and scientific study of every aspect of 
the problems presented. Unfortunately, changes in the political and 
legal structure of the nation are seldom, if ever, made in a scientific 
fashion. Alterations come as the result of irresistible pressures of popular 
beliefs (too often fallacies), and the coup d1 etats of political parties and 
of other organized pressure groups. But at least careful studies by legal 
scholars of the situations in which changes seem indicated may con­
tribute to better results than otherwise would be obtained. 
There is perhaps no greater field for fruitful study than that basic 
desideratum1 a sound division of powers between the Federal Union and 
the several states. The Constitution itself affords no definite basis upon 
which the decision can be made. The reservation to the states, or to the 
people, of those powers not granted to the Federal government, nor 
prohibited to the states, is far from being a rule of thumb, by which it 
is possible to make the division of powers, under modern conditions. 
If the powers granted to the Federal government were definite and un­
changing powers, the problem would not be so difficult; but the fact is 
that the grants are, 111 most respects, general in terms and capable of 
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expansion and contraction as conditions change. The powers reserved to 
the states are not specific or definite; they are residuary. Thus we find 
that the treaty-making power, the powers to regulate interstate com­
merce, to tax and to maintain the postoffice, may vitally affect matters 
which primarily fall within the range of state control. 
Nor can limits to Federal power be set by declaring that the govern­
ment of the United States possesses no police power. That assertion has 
often been made because of a restri�ted and erroneous theory as to the 
nature of the police power, which had an undeserved vogue, especially 
during our early history. Of course the Federal government possesses 
police power, -not in its complete range, -but all police power apper­
taining to its granted powers. And so the Supreme Court of the United 
States, in the case of Brooks v. the United States) 267 U. S. 432) in up­
holding a certain congressional act, says: "In doing this it (Congress) is 
merely exercising the police power for the benefit of the public, within 
the field of interstate commerce." 
The doubts which exist today as to how far the "New Deal " legisla­
tion and the codes adopted thereunder may be validly applied to the 
industry and business of the country, are most perplexing. There are 
numerous Supreme Court decisions sustaining the exercise of Con­
gressional power in relation to certain aspects of business, which, stand­
ing apart, would be held to be wholly local. But because of the reaction 
of these local businesses upon interstate commerce, and because the grant 
of interstate commerce power is plenary, the courts have held that it 
may be exerted upon these local businesses, if they vitally affect interstate 
comn1erce. 
In last analysis, decisions as to whether the exercise of Congressional 
power in relation to such matters is valid or not will depend not upon 
precise expressions in the Constitution, nor upon any mere rules of law, 
but upon the application of broad principles and standards afforded by 
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the Constitution, interpreted in the light of existing facts and applied 
thereto. Economic and general social considerations have exercised, and 
will continue to exercise, irresistible pressure for increase in the exertion 
of Federal powers. On the other hand, there is undeniable danger in the 
amassing of great powers in the Federal government and in the relative 
loss of power and prestige by the state and local governments. How can 
the clashing interests and principles involved be so reconciled as to 
secure the greatest possible good? Is it not clear that here is a precious 
opportunity for universities like this and others represented here today, 
with their specialists in the fields of law, economics, political theory, 
sociology and history, to examine this great governmental problem 
objectively and to furnish material for those charged with the respon­
sibility of governmental action? 
Another great opportunity is afforded by study of the problem of 
adjusting to the needs of contemporary society the basic requirement of 
our constitutional system-that the powers of government shall be 
separated and distributed to different arms of government. 
Correct solutions of the basic political and legal problems thus inade­
quately touched upon would doubtless go far toward the solution of 
another perplexing controversy, which in a sense lies athwart our whole 
national life, namely-that of determining a scientifically sound balance 
and adjustment between individualism and collectivism. It is said that 
the American people are by temperament disposed to individualism. 
Probably this is true of a great majority of us, but we cannot close our 
eyes to the fact that the tremendous increase in our population, and the 
conditions of modern industrial society, have made anything like com­
plete individualism impossible. Whether we like it or not, individualism 
in its extreme form has been largely crushed out of existence, not by 
government, but by the voluntary movements of society and the in­
creased tendency toward the organization of great pressure groups. For 
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example, how much play for individualism has the unskilled worker, and 
most skilled workers, in securing employment from the massed and 
organized industry, which is so characteristic of modern society? To 
attain some approximation toward equality in bargaining for employ­
ment, labor has organized itself into great unions, within which it per­
mits practically no individualism whatever. So it is that in many indus­
tries today the energetic, able and intelligent worker must control his 
output of work and find his wages limited by the necessities of less 
capable and less conscientious workers. It is idle to rail against govern­
ment for developing socialization of modern life, in view of the compre­
hensive and large-scale limitation of individualism by organized em­
ployers, organized workers, organized merchants and consolidated 
transportation agencies. The extreme individualism of the r 8th century 
and the laissez faire policies of John Stuart Mill have little place in 
modern society. 
The contemporary political and popular discussion of this subject is 
characterized very largely by prejudice, self-interest, and ignorance of 
fact, and it creates far more heat than light upon the subject. Here again, 
in perhaps the most fundamental and the most important of all problems 
to be settled by modern society, there is golden opportunity for calm, 
objective and scientific study of the matters involved. 
I have surveyed all too sketchily a few of the outstanding legal prob­
lems of our time, and those few all in the domain of public law. But our 
entire legal order bristles with vexed questions and friction points which 
incite the scholar to renewed labor, to invigorated, imaginative, profound 
research, that he may contribute his mite to the amelioration and the 
sound prosperity of our national life. And I have said little that, in a 
superficial sense, would seem to relate to teaching, and teaching is after 
all a primary obligation of any school. But in a truer, more profound 
sense, all that has been said concerns the well-springs from which all 
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vital teaching must arise. In the eloquent words of Mr. Justice Holmes: 
''The aim of a law school should be . . .  not to make men smart, but to 
make them wise in their calling-to start them on a road which will lead 
them to the abode of the masters . . . .  Education, other than self-educa­
tion, lies mainly in shaping men's interests and aims. If you convince a 
man that another way of looking at things is more profound, another 
form of pleasure more subtile than that to which he has been accus­
tomed-if you make him really see it-the very nature of man is such 
that he will desire the profounder thought and the subtiler joy. So I say 
the business of a law school is not sufficiently described when you merely 
say that it is to teach law, or to make lawyers. It is to teach law in the 
grand manner and to make great lawyers. " And you cannot teach law in 
the grand manner upon an accumulation of stale information. The 
material of instruction must be kept fresh and vital by constant research. 
Mr. Cook has accompanied his gift of buildings and endowment with 
a statement of his hopes and purposes, which are comprehensive and 
liberal. He has wisely refrained from hampering those who must 
administer his foundation by imposing upon them rigid conditions or 
meticulous details as to methods or materials. But his generating thought 
and his central plan are crystal-clear. Without denying to those working 
in other fields their part in the preservation of sound American institu­
tions, he has declared his conviction that the American Bar and American 
Law Schools have had, and in the future should have, a great and influential 
part in shaping American life. Therefore, he has provided that his gift 
shall be used by the School of which he was a graduate, not only for the 
teaching of law and the training of superior lawyers, but for the scientific 
study of law, in its most comprehensive sense, that the School may make 
its contribution to a better Corpus Juris and a better American life. 
Mr. President, the Faculty of our Law School are deeply grateful for 
the priceless opportunity which is theirs, through Mr. Cook's idealism 
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and generosity. And equally, and with genuine humility of spirit, they 
recognize the great responsibility and obligation which rest upon them. 
They pledge themselves now, as we dedicate the superbly beautiful 
structures in which the work is to be carried on, to strive with all the 
strength and wisdom they may command for the realization of the lofty 
ideals of the brilliant American lawyer, to honor whose memory and 
ideals we have met here today. 
Law and Laws 
1n the Twentieth Century 
By ROSCOE POUND 
Carter Professor of Jurisprudence and Dean of the Faculty of Law 
in Harvard University 
WE ARE here to dedicate a magnificent group of buildings built from the munificence of a lawyer to be devoted to the teaching of law and to research in law. For three quarters of 
a century, a great state has maintained here a notable law school. It has 
been a school in which law has been taught, not merely to the people of 
the state, but in such wise as to bring here a national student body to 
learn a national law. Its wise founders had, it may be, builded better 
than they knew. For in making of the law school of the state a school for 
the nation they had better provided for the needs of the state in the era 
of economic unification which has supervened. Also it has been a school 
from which have come great law books, used in every part of the land, 
which have helped to give shape and content to American law. Now to 
this work of the state there is added a great private endowment-out­
standing in a land and a time of lavish endowment of education and 
scientific research-the first adequate endowment for the teaching and 
study of law and for the scientific investigation which in other fields has 
come to be our chief reliance for making human activities effective for 
their ends. What may we hope from these buildings? What may we hope 
from the work to be carried on here for generations to come which shall 
justify the founder as the work of the past had justified the state? 
25 
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We have been told recently that there are but two necessary callings. 
We have been told that two only will maintain themselves in the ideal 
state of society into which we are entering, namely, that of engineer and 
that of physician. In this ideal society, it seems that although through 
the development of psychology men will have reached such n<ental and 
moral power of voluntary control that no experts in organized social 
control will be needed, they will still have need of further mechanical 
devices and will still have grievous bodily ailments. We shall not reach 
mechanical perfection nor bodily perfection. But political and economic 
perfection are to do away with all experts and specialists other than those 
who have to do with the physical existence. Such pronouncements are 
characteristic of the era of machinery. If physics itself has been turning 
of late to logic, if not to metaphysics, the modes of thought of the time 
have been fashioned to the mold of the cocksure Victorian physics and 
look to it for a model for the social sciences. Physical science did such 
great things in the last and in the present century that its prophets are 
forgetful of the conquest of internal nature which had made the progress 
of physics possible-which has made possible division of labor and 
setting free of inventive genius to discover things-and would rest the 
whole of civilization upon man's mastery of external nature. 
In all times of political optimism two ideas have had much currency 
with the lay public. One is that somehow a social order may be attained 
in which no administration of justice will be needed. The other is that 
so long as administration of justice is necessary, justice would be better 
administered if there were no authoritative body of legal precepts and 
no adherence to the course of decision in the past, but each case were 
determined by the common sense and sense of justice of a strong and 
upright judge unhampered by rules or technical principles or technical 
conceptions. Today this idea takes the form of belief in boards and com­
missions and administrative officials, adjusting human relations and 
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directing individual conduct on a conception of each case as unique, to 
be disposed of without reference to any other, with a strong hand or on 
such considerations of fair play or sympathy for the oppressed or weaker 
party or of distribution of the economic surplus as appeal to them for the 
time being. The ideal is taken to be a society of just men who require no 
law and just judges who are equal to administering justice without law. 
Things are not so simple as is assumed in the lay notion that if men 
were just there would be no need of law. Just men may and do differ 
justly as to many difficult questions of adjustment of human relations. 
For example, the law has continually to fix the incidence of loss as 
between persons wholly or equally blameless, or as between persons 
equally or alike culpable. Thus in cases of injury where there is con­
tributory negligence, no less than five methods of imposing or distribut­
ing the loss are possible and any practicable solution of this problem of 
who shall bear it is at best a compromise. 
Also it happens often that in order to maintain the general security 
the law must require a definite course of action as to matters which are 
morally indifferent. Take, for example, the questions which arise when 
one makes something new by using another's materials. The Roman 
jurists of the classical period were not agreed as to the principles of 
deciding with respect to ownership in such cases and Justinian adopted 
a conclusion of his own quite different from that of either of the second 
century schools. The modern codes do not agree with each other nor 
with the Roman law on these cases, and the French Civil Code adopts 
no rule but leaves the matter to be dealt with by the courts on the facts of 
each case. The common law does not agree with the Roman law in these 
situations nor do common-law jurisdictions agree with each other. The 
explanation is that the exigencies of the economic order demand that 
there be certain rules determining the ownership of property. But in 
these and other cases decisions have to be made upon questions which 
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have no clear moral import and upon which there are no received views 
in current morality. The just man has been provided by nature with no 
sufficient apparatus, merely because he is just, for dealing with such 
cases. An ideal justice without technicality will not uphold the economic 
order where maintenance of the security of transactions and security of 
acquisitions calls for rules as to matters morally indifferent. 
Nor, if I may revert to my first example, is it possible to maintain the 
general security on the basis of the judgments of just men as to moral 
blameworthiness at the crisis of particular actions. Intentional aggressions 
and culpable carelessnesses are not the only things which menace the 
general security in the crowded, machine operating, complex social order 
of the time. Claims to security and claims to spontaneous free action 
have to be harmonized and the task of reaching a workable adjustment 
for each case would make impossible an adequate disposition of the 
thousands and tens of thousands of controversies upon the dockets of 
the courts of our large cities. Experience has shown abundantly the need 
of objective standards both for the guidance of judges and administrative 
officials and for measures of conduct for the individual. Indeed, in spite 
of the juristic theory of the last century, which sought to make liability 
absolutely dependent upon fault, there has been a steadily increasing 
development of standards to which the legal order requires men to con­
form at their peril. It is idle to speak of such things as "technical" and of 
the technique of applying them as "legalism." If one sees only the indi­
vidual case and measures it by a conventional moral label applied with 
reference to but one of the conBicting or overlapping interests involved, 
it may seem that the legal solution leaves out elements which from a 
moral or economic or social standpoint should be decisive. It cannot be 
denied that this does sometimes happen. But in most cases it is rather 
the so-called common sense solution which overlooks elements that in 
the long run prove to be crucial for a practicable adjustment. The lay-
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man's method of valuing by affixing conventional moral labels is itself 
crudely technical. Every practical art has technicalities of the same sort 
as those of the legal order, expressing generations of experience and 
enabling all that men have learned in a long process of civilization to be 
applied intelligently to the problem of the moment. The most just of 
men will need an apparatus of technicalities and a technique of applying 
them, or in the alternative a technical adviser, if he is to act justly and effec­
tively in the conduct of enterprises in a complex social and economic order. 
A corollary of the idea that ideal justice would proceed without law 
is that an ideal administration of justice would go on without lawyers. 
But it may be said with entire truth that there is no systematic social 
control in a developed politically organized society without lawyers. 
Law, as we know it in a developed state, begins with lawyers. It begins 
when the tradition of conduct of transactions, decision of causes, and 
advising parties to controversies becomes secularized and passes into the 
hands of a specialized profession. At Rome a turning point is reached 
when the traditional formulae of actions are divulged and when, some­
what later, the first plebeian pontifex maximus begins to give consulta­
tions in public so that students may attend and take notes. Modern law 
has its beginnings when Roman law became the rival of the law of the 
church and presently set itself free from clerical control. In English 
legal history, the supremacy of the king' s courts, which gave us the com­
mon law, might well be dated from the Constitutions of Clarendon 
which put definite and narrow limits to the jurisdiction of the ecclesias­
tical courts. Likewise, in colonial America, especially in New England, 
the history of law begins when the administration of justice begins to 
come into the hands of professional lawyers, after a regime of magisterial 
and legislative justice carried on chiefly by means of clerical and military 
magistrates. Justice according to law is justice administered by lawyer 
judges aided by lawyer advocates. 
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An example of the task of the legal order may be seen in the age long 
struggle to reach some workable adjustment between the claims of the 
general security and those of free individual life in the law as to associa­
tions. In all times and everywhere the activities of different forms of free 
association have driven lawmakers and jurists to seek practical means of 
limiting legally the individual interest in free association so that its 
exercise shall not be allowed, on the one hand, to tie down too tight 
each individual's claim to free self-assertion, nor, on the other hand, to 
threaten the supreme authority of the state and thus impair the social 
control on which civilization rests. Legislators and courts and jurists 
have had to find how the natural human power of combined action can 
be curtailed without taking from freedom much of its worth and yet 
how to leave it unchecked without taking away much of the freedom of 
others or destroying the power of government. The naive view which 
sees a society without lawyer's law, in which natural justice is adminis­
tered for each case by just men applying their ideas of justice for the 
time being, sees in such problems merely the selfish greediness of em­
ployers or the selfish grasp for power of labor leaders or the unreason­
ableness of workingmen. But the matter is not so simple. It is a phase of 
the task of reconciling the demands of the general security with those of 
the individual life which is fundamental for social engineering. Thus 
far, no one has been able to harmonize the two overlapping or conflicting 
interests-the interest in individual freedom and the interest in free 
association-otherwise than by some sort of compromise. This com­
promise, as in so many cases in the legal order, has to be worked out by 
experience of what will secure the most of human claims with the least 
friction and the least waste. When a working compromise is found, it 
will in a sense be "technical." It will be expressed in a legal formula to 
be applied by a legal technique. Very likely doctrinal writers will develop 
it further and work out certain resulting legal conceptions. Without such 
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an organization of experience by reason the task of adjusting these 
claims in any particular case of clash would be hopeless in any society of 
much economic development. 
For another example consider the questions which arise in connection 
with defamation. A newspaper receives and publishes in good faith what 
on its face is an innocent item of news which, nevertheless, under cir­
cumstances not appearing on its face is grievously defamatory of an 
innocent person. Or, a man receives information under circumstances 
making it credible, which, if true, shows that an employee of a neighbor 
is so misconducting himself as to threaten serious loss to the neighbor. 
Under a conviction of moral duty he communicates the information to 
the employer and as a result an innocent employee is discharged. Here 
we must seek a compromise between claims of freedom of speaking and 
writing, claims to one's honor, reputation, and4 peace of mind, and 
claims not to be injured in one's substance. In general, in the United 
States in the practical workings of the established legal compromise it 
allows much freedom of publication but affords relatively little protec­
tion against defamation. In England, it protects against defamation but 
the press considers that it unduly curtails freedom of writing and pub­
lishing. It is largely because there are so many cases where no wholly 
satisfactory adjustment is possible, that so much of the law is apt to 
appear so technical. The party whose interests remain unrecognized or 
under-secured will regard the process as arbitrary or technical or legalis­
tic, as the phrase may be at the moment. 
Historically, and in particular in the matter of our political and legal 
institutions, we are an English people. Hence our political institutions 
are legal and our legal institutions are political. It is in our inheritance 
to govern according to law and to exact of all in authority that they 
e·xercise the authority reasonably and to the ordered measure of law. But 
we are also a new-world people and so an impatient people, with faith in 
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doing things and expecting to do them rather than leaving them to do 
themselves. We are loth to await the slow processes of history whereby 
experience points out the practicable paths of progress. Thus we rely on 
the one hand upon law, and on the other hand upon laws. The balance 
between these two sides of our legal and political character has always 
been hard to maintain. The last century stressed reliance on law and 
ordered formulation of experience. The present inclines instead to laws 
and stresses creative legislation and administration. If it is to be the 
function of a science of law to make experience and creative genius 
effective for the ends of the legal order by wise appraisal and sound 
formulation of the one and intelligent direction of the other, Mr. 
Cook's foundation comes at the psychological moment. 
Law is something more than an aggregate of laws. Laws are rules. But 
law is much more than a body of rules. Law gives life to rules. Law is 
needed to make laws instruments of justice. Rules are made in advance, 
sometimes to formulate experience, more usually on rationalist ideas of 
social advantage, not infrequently to meet the exigent self-interest of 
some vigorous, self-assertive group. Law arises from the application of 
these laws and the endeavor of lawyers to make of them a coherent sys­
tem, operating according to an ideal, and furthering justice. Principles, 
conceptions, doctrines, a received technique of finding the grounds of 
decision of cases and of advice to clients in the body of laws and the 
principles, conceptions and doctrines built upon and around them, and 
a body of received ideals by which application of laws and development 
of rules are gl;lided, are the work of courts and jurists and lawyers and 
constitute the law. Without law, laws are but empty formulas and law 
can attain no effective development without lawyers. 
In the Middle Ages, in an age of authority men sought to attain jus­
tice through rules. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in an age 
of rationalism, they sought to bring about justice through reason. In the 
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maturity of the competitive individualist economic order in the nine­
teenth century they sought it through metaphysically demonstrated and 
legally guaranteed rights, whereby the fullest and freest self-assertion was 
assured to each man. Today they are seeking it through legislation on a 
social utilitarian theory of bringing about a maximum of social advan­
tage, or through administrative individualization, without rules, without 
regard to logical requirements, and regarding rights not as ends to be 
safeguarded but as means toward scarcely apprehended social ends. We 
may recognize that no one of these methods will attain justice in every 
case and for every purpose. Traditional rules, reason, a logically orga­
nized system of recognized and secured interests, creative thought har­
nessed to the work of lawmaking, and intuition and discretion operating 
through administrative hierarchies and tribunals have each contributed 
to the legal order. Each has possibilities for the legal order of today and 
of tomorrow. We are not to cast out any of them. Rather we must seek 
to know how and when and where to use them and it may be to find how 
to supplement them by such new instruments as we can discover. If the 
watchword of the Middle Ages was authority, the watchword of the seven­
teenth and eighreenth centuries reason, and that of the nineteenth century 
freedom given effecr by rights, the watchword of today must be research. 
Much of what gives us trouble in the legal order in twentieth-century 
America is in the law, particularly in the ideal element in law, which 
needs to be organized, criticized, and reshaped to the urban, industrial 
society of the time. A gradual but well marked shift from the local to the 
national or even universal, in a unified economic order, a shift from a 
regime of individual acquisitive and competitive self-assertion to one of 
co-operation, call for creative work in law, and as things are now much 
research must go before that work. But much of what gives trouble is in 
laws, and here, too, the remedy is not to give over laws or make more 
laws, but to go forward in the development of law. 
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There are those in our law schools who seem to deny that there is law 
in the sense I am suggesting; who know single legal propositions or single 
decisions or single instances, but deny the reality of principles and con­
ceptions and doctrines, and a fortiori of ideals. But I submit that in such 
a connection "real" means "significant." The technique of developing, 
interpreting and applying rules of law, the ideals by which the processes 
of developing, interpreting and applying them are directed, by which 
content is given to formulas and conceptions, by which choice between 
competing starting points for legal reasoning is determined, by which 
interests are valued in order to recognize, delimit, and secure them intel­
ligently-these are the enduring and significant elements in the legal 
order. In the only sense in which the word "real" has any useful meaning 
in jurisprudence, they are the real law. The rise of administrative boards 
and commissions and tribunals seems to some to portend the end of law. 
One might as truly say that they portend a new beginning. The tribunals 
are called for by and in turn they call for more laws. More laws will 
inevitably demand more law. We might well amend the classical state­
ment of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights and seek a government of laws 
applied and administered by men according to law. 
In the economically unified America of today, the role of law in bind­
ing together and harmonizing the diverse laws or bodies of rules of 
forty-eight states goes far to make our system of separate local jurisdic­
tions workable. Our received common-law technique has enabled the 
law in each locality to develop rapidly in a rapidly developing land by 
making it possible for the courts anywhere to avail themselves of the 
sum of judicial experience and juristic activity everywhere. More than 
this, law has made it possible for businesses and enterprises transcending 
state lines-as all of any consequence must today-to function effec­
tively under a welter of conflicting local laws. 
Indeed, law had already had a like task before it in the Middle Ages. 
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While the universities conceived of and taught a universal law, the 
actual bodies of laws of local feudal jurisdictions and of the city-states 
of medieval Italy were anything but universal. Each feudal jurisdiction 
had its own peculiar local customs. Each Italian city-state had its own 
statutes. With the growth of commerce and business enterprise questions 
continually arose as to what legal precept governed a particular transac­
tion or situation as between different local customs or local statutes, 
where some of the parties lived or some part of the transaction took 
place or something was to be performed. To some extent such questions 
had arisen in the maturity of Roman law, as between diverse local cus­
toms recognized and allowed a local force by the Roman legal polity. 
But such questions arose on a large scale as between the Italian city­
states of the Middle Ages, just as they have arisen on a large scale as 
between the states of the United States in the last half century. Obvi­
ously a workable solution had to be along universal lines. It had to be 
one which would be acceptable in all of the jurisdictions concerned. It 
had to be one appealing to jurists and judges everywhere. It would not 
have done to seek to impose the traditions or received precepts of any 
local system upon other localities. The universal ideal of the medieval 
academic jurists was, therefore, exceptionally well fitted to be the back­
ground of a solution. The Commentators, who were university teachers 
of law, drew a theory from the Roman texts, with the received technique 
of the civil law, and drew it so well on simple lines generally acceptable, 
that the great subject of conflict of laws has kept to those lines ever 
since. Here is one subject in the law governing private relations where 
common-law lawyers and civilians understand each other and use the 
same ideas and the same terms; where Story and Savigny are cited equally 
throughout the world. It is due chiefly to the universal ideal of the 
medieval jurists that a conflict of laws is not a conflict of law; that there 
can be an orderly adjustment of relations and claims involved in inter-
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state transactions and enterprises notwithstanding the multiplicity of 
divergent local laws. The conflict of laws is resolved and obviated by 
the unity of law. 
Much is said today in disparagement of what is called "legalism." 
"Legalistic" is a current term of reproach. When these words have more 
behind them than a vague hankering for offhand justice administered to 
order by a strong man benevolently inclined, they refer to the reliance on 
laws rather than on law by which in the last century men sought to main­
tain the security of acquisitions and security of transactions; they refer 
to the measuring of claims and items of conduct and situations by a law 
rather than by the law. 
This distinction between law and laws, between the law and a law, 
perceived by some jurists from the beginnings of a science of law, has 
given trouble to others from the beginning and has been denied by a 
succession of sceptics or positivists or realists, as they have called them­
selves at different times and in different places. 
Men obey their rulers or conform to prescribed standards of social con­
duct partly because they are constrained to do so or know or fear they 
will be constrained to do so by the force of those who exercise authority 
under politically organized society. Pardy, also, they do so because they 
and their forbears and their fellows have been in the habit of so doing. 
Pardy, again, they do so because, for whatever of many reasons, they feel 
that they ought to do so. None of these conceptions of the basis of 
obedience to the legal order is the whole story. Yet, since the Greek 
philosophers of the fifth century before Christ, attempt has been made 
to explain the legal order, and the body of authoritative precepts for 
guidance of judicial and administrative action, and the judicial and 
administrative processes wholly in terms of the one or the other of them. 
Some Greek philosophers thought of laws getting their authority from 
enactment and rules of ethical custom resting on convention, but also, in 
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contrast with these, a higher type of precept getting its authority from 
conformity with the nature of things or ideal of things. The realist of 
today is in the right line of juristic descent from the Cynics who denied 
that things were right with reference to an ideal and asserted that they 
could only be just when measured by convention or enactment. 
Under one set of names or another this contrast between enacted or 
traditionally prescribed precepts, on the one hand, and ideals of what 
legal precepts should be and how they should be applied, on the other 
hand, has persisted into the present. The Romans distinguished the ius 
ciuile, the body of rules applicable to Roman citizens, on the one hand, 
and ius naturale, a speculative body of principles expressing the nature 
(i.e. , the ideal) of things, on the other. The Middle Ages recognized the 
authority of the Roman texts, on the one hand, but a rationally demon­
strated law of nature-the part of the eternal law or reason of the divine 
wisdom governing the universe addressing an "ought" to reasoning 
creatures-on the other hand. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
thought of an ideal code of rules, a body of ideal precepts derived from 
reason. But in practice they assumed that the texts of the Roman law 
were as a general proposition declaratory of those ideal precepts. For the 
most part, the nineteenth-century jurists were in reaction from this 
over-emphasis on the ideal and so swung to the other extreme. They 
ignored the ideal as their immediate predecessors had ignored the actual. 
They sought to give the precepts which had actual (as distinguished from 
ideal) authority in the time and place a basis in the sovereignty of a 
politically organized society or in history. In one of these views law was 
no more than an aggregate of laws authoritatively established or received. 
In the other, it was no less than all social control. In each there was no 
place for ideals. 
It is a commonplace that some kind of change has been taking place 
in the economic order and that it must be reflected in laws and in law. 
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Those who keep up the one tradition of juristic thought have preached 
the economic interpretation of law and legal history or economic deter­
minism or economic realism or most recently psychological realism. 
They see primarily what takes place in the legal order and in the judicial 
process and take it that it is significant as it takes place. Those who keep 
up the other tradition have revived philosophical jurisprudence and see 
significance in the development of new ideals reflecting more accurately 
the economic order of the time. Very likely the adherents of the one 
tradition are doing a needed work of clearing away. At any rate, it seems 
to be the adherents of the other tradition who are doing and are to do the 
building. 
There must be a balance of what is and of what ought to be. No one 
can study the history of precepts and conceptions and doctrines without 
seeing that in law what is is constantly reshaped to the model of juristic 
pictures of what ought to be. Yet we cannot ignore what is. It is just 
this which has to be reshaped. Ideals do not realize themselves. Men 
make them real by measuring and criticizing precepts, in their content 
and in their operation, by them and taking them as goals of creative 
thinking. A body of legal ideals not put to such use is wholly sterile. It 
is a difficult feat to reconcile and bring into one system of juristic 
thought stability and change, authority and reason, is and ought to be, 
rule and discretion, legislation and administration, statutes and doc­
trinal and judicial tradition. But such is the task of a science of law in a 
period of growth and adaptation. Because we have to do with what 
ought to be we are not to ignore what is. Yet our occupation with what 
is has its justification in enabling us to establish what ought to be. 
I do not forget that a "pure science of law," resting on logic as the 
science of law of the eighteenth century rested on reason, is expected in 
some quarters to deliver us from subjectivity and uncertainty. In the 
same way the analytical jurisprudence of the nineteenth century achieved 
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an illusory certainty by postulating a ''pure fact of law,'' that is, by con­
cerning itself with laws as distinguished from law. Such theories attain 
a superficial solution of the problems of the legal order by relegating 
them to other fields, where they will still await solution. It does not 
help us to turn the problem of a measure of values for human wants and 
claims and demands and the theory of selecting, recognizing, delimiting 
and securing of interests over to a science of legislation or to the "politics 
of law.'' Wherever we put them they remain fundamental questions of 
the first importance and of the first difficulty. A science of law that does 
not grapple with them is pedantic and jejune. If the law teachers do not 
take them up scientifically, we shall go on in blundering legislative and 
judicial and administrative quests for solutions for the purposes of par­
ticular situations, and in a time of change when such help is most needed 
laws will be without adequate help from law. 
In the progressive movement of a generation ago new agencies of 
direct popular lawmaking and direct popular adjudication were expected 
to bring laws and the application of laws into accord with social advan­
tage. After the lapse of a generation we may perceive that such methods 
have achieved little or nothing. Despite the backwardness of law because 
of received ideals out of touch with the social order of the time, the 
enduring progress has been in the course of judicial decision and in the 
adaptation of our legal tradition. 
True, we lawyers must not flatter ourselves that even the most we can 
do toward making the law what it ought to be will do the whole or, of 
itself, perhaps the major part of making straight the paths of a coming 
social and economic order. On the other hand, the part of the law will 
not be a mean one. No new deals and no reforms and no social or 
economic programs which may be expected to take enduring shape in 
such time as we may foresee are likely to do away with the need of 
adjusting human relations and fixing lines for human conduct in a finite 
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world where all the demands of every one cannot be satisfied. Nor are 
we likely to find super-magistrates or super-officials or super-commis­
sioners to whom the royal prerogative of doing justice without law-of 
adjusting conflicting claims and regulating relations and fixing lines of 
permissible conduct pro hac vice by the light of nature-may be en­
trusted with any reasonable assurance of a balance between the general 
security and the individual life. Our ambitious schemes of social reform 
call not for fewer laws but for more laws, and so for more and more 
effective law. Hence the call of the time is not for less training or less 
specialization on the part of those who will have to do with the admini­
stration of justice, but for more. Moreover, whatever other ends develop 
or become recognized, the administration of justice bids fair to remain 
a chief end of politically organized society and the legal order and law to 
remain the chief agencies by which it attains that end. Nothing short of 
anarchy at the one pole or the millennium at the other is likely to obviate 
the social need for law and lawyers. 
Let me be understood. I do not for a moment hold to the legal and 
juristic pessimism of the last century. I should be the last to urge that 
the law teacher is to sit by and observe and note, while some intrinsic 
power of evolution develops a law for the twentieth century out of that 
of the nineteenth. Faith in the efficacy of effort is one of the articles in 
the creed of the jurist of today. But there are limits to what may be done 
by means of laws and law, as a recent large scale experiment has made us 
aware. The legal order is not equal to the whole task of social engineer­
ing. No amount of creative lawmaking, however wisely developed by 
law and applied by lawyers, can achieve all the purposes of social control, 
can do all the work of maintaining, furthering and transmitting 
civilization. 
Moreover, in order to be effective, effort must be directed intelli­
gently. It must take account of much which the rationalism of the last 
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century failed to see. We cannot assume that social advantage is some­
thing which he who runs may read. It is not something to be discovered 
by a mere scrutiny of the phenomena of social life within the horizon of 
the particular observer as he looks about him. Study of the legal order 
in action, study of the social effects of legal precepts, study of how the 
legal order attains or fails to attain its ends in particular situations and 
why, must go on for a long time and in many places and must enlist the 
best energies of many well trained investigators before we may act with 
assurance upon many of the complex legal problems which are also social 
and economic and political problems in America of today. 
On another occasion I urged four points in this connection which I 
venture to repeat. One is that the one-man research of the past, though 
I agree that it may still do much, will no longer suffice for our greater 
problems. Another is that the partisan made-to-order research which is 
carried on under the auspices and for the purposes of trades and busi­
nesses and organized interests, which has had so much to do with prepa­
ration for recent American legislation, will but aggravate an increasingly 
bad condition in our local lawmaking. Another is that research must be 
done upon subjects as a whole, from a nation-wide or even world-wide 
standpoint. Finally, it cannot be done fruitfully if under pressure to do 
it in a hurry. It must be done cooperatively by scholars of many types 
and in many subjects uniting their learning, their organized experience, 
and their trained energies in a joint effort. It must be done not upon 
single controversies as they arise, but upon the whole field out of which 
they arise. 
In Continental Europe, such things are committed to ministries of 
justice. But such institutions are not in touch with the genius of English­
speaking peoples and we may be long in setting them up. The alternative 
is organized, systematic legal research in our universities, where it can 
and will be carried on for its own sake in a purely scientific spirit. In the 
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law schools of universities the conditions of effective quest for truth and 
the guarantees of public confidence are assured. In the law school of a 
state university there is already the foundation of a public ministry of 
justice, and every university law school may be made the nucleus of an 
effective American substitute. 
A time of confident political enthusiasm is propitious for entering 
upon projects of research in the operations and problems and ends of the 
legal order. The present moment is not the first time in which we have 
been confident that we were entering upon a new era of political and 
legal perfection and that in a twinkling of an eye we should all be 
changed. The great seal of the United States, as originally adopted, bore 
the device novus ordo saeclorum-a new order of the ages. The political 
literature of the rise of Jeffersonian democracy is full of glowing 
prophecies of a new politics and a new law, governed by reason and in 
accord with a rationalist morals. If these anticipations were not realized, 
nevertheless we must not forget that because the men of that age be­
lieved they could do great things they were able to do great things-not 
the least of them the framing of the Constitution of the United States 
and the reshaping of the received English law of the seventeenth century 
and making of it a law for the new world in the nineteenth century. It is 
true, as we look back on the enthusiastic pronouncements of formative 
America we see that much less was newly made of whole cloth than men 
supposed. We see much continuity, legal and political, with seventeenth­
century England. As legal historians look back hereafter they may very 
likely see much continuity of their time with ours and of both with the 
nineteenth century. But what will make it a continuity of living tissue 
will be, if I see aright, the work of teaching and research in our law 
schools, and not the least that which will have gone on upon this spot. 
May the lawyers of the future be able to date a new era in the effective­
ness of the legal order in the United States from this endowment for 
law teaching and legal research. 
Address 
By HARLAN F. STONE 
Associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States 
WE ARE met to commemorate an event, notable alike in the history of this University and of our profession. For the first time it has been given to an American university to 
establish a unit completely organized and equipped for the training of 
lawyers, for research in legal science, and for the intimate association at 
a common meeting place of students and teachers of law with the mem­
bers of the Bench and Bar. By that magic which only the modern world 
has known, in a brief interval of time all the physical equipment which 
skill and ingenuity could devise to aid those engaged in the common 
enterprise of advancing the science of the law has been here assembled, 
clothed in architectural forms of enduring beauty, and richly endowed 
to insure its service in perpetuity. All this has come about through the 
far-seeing generosity of a graduate of this University. To him it was 
given to see a vision, as he in his own words has described it, of the 
legal profession of the nation, profoundly influenced by its law schools, 
taking its proper place in the development of American institutions. 
What we here see and dedicate to this useful service is the tangible 
evidence of his faith in that vision. 
We meet at a time when, as never before in the history of the country, 
our most cherished ideals and traditions are being subjected to searching 
criticism. The towering edifice of business and industry, which had be­
come the dominating feature of the American social structure, has been 
shaken to its foundations by forces, the full significance of which we 
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still can see but dimly. What had seemed the impregnable fortress of a 
boasted civilization has developed unsuspected weakness and in conse­
quence we are now engaged in the altogether wholesome task of critical 
re-examination of what our hands have reared. 
From this inquiry the law and the lawyer may claim no immunity. It 
is true, if tradition and history are guides, that we may rightly look to 
the Bar for leadership in the preservation and development of American 
institutions. Specially trained in the field of law and government, in­
vested with the special privileges of his office, experienced in the world 
of affairs, and versed in the problems of business organization and 
administration, to whom, if not to the lawyer, may we look for guidance 
in solving the problems of a sorely stricken social order. 
No tradition of our profession is more cherished by lawyers than that 
of its leadership in public affairs. We dwell upon the part of lawyers in 
the creation of the Federal Constitution and in the organization of the 
national government and our federal and state judicial systems. The role 
they played in politics and government in the first half of the last century 
is a familiar part of our history. The records of the early Bar associations 
in the thirteen original states afford convincing evidence that the lawyers 
of the time took more than a perfunctory interest in the social obliga­
tions of the profession. We find their Bar organizations actively super­
vising and controlling membership in the Bar and setting standards of 
admission to it higher than those which prevail in most of those states 
today. In a very real sense they were guardians of the law, cherishing the 
legitimate influence of their guild as that of a profession charged with 
public duties and responsibilities. The great figures of the law stir the 
imagination and inspire our reverence according as they have used their 
special training and gifts for the advancement of the public interest. 
Coke, standing steadfast against the encroachment of the crown on the 
prerogatives of parliament; John Hampden, with his group of famous 
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counsel reststmg m the courts the levy of ship money by the crown; 
James Otis, the stalwart defender of the right of free speech, throwing 
up his commission as Advocate General of Massachusetts to argue against 
writs of assistance; John Marshall, with prophetic vision, welding the 
clashing states into a united nation; all are names to which we recur as 
symbols of the power of public leadership of the Bar at its best. 
All this is justly the subject of pride to lawyers. The records of almost 
any Bar Association meeting reveal our readiness to turn back to these 
pages of a glorious past, because they portray those ideals of our pro­
fession to which we would most willingly pay tribute. Yet candor would 
compel even those of us who have the most abiding faith in our pro­
fession, and the firmest belief in its capacity for future usefulness, to 
admit that in our time the Bar has not maintained its traditional position 
of public influence and leadership. Although it tends to prove the point, 
it is not of the first importance that there are fewer lawyers of standing 
serving in the halls of legislatures or in executive or administrative posts 
than in earlier days. Public office is not the only avenue to public influ­
ence. Representatives of other professions in public position have always 
been comparatively few, but wherever questions of professional concern 
to them touch the public interest, they are nevertheless profoundly influ­
ential. In matters of sanitation and public health, in great public under­
takings involving engineering knowledge and skill, we place ourselves 
unreservedly in their hands. But it is not without its lesson for us that 
most laymen, at least, would deny that there is today a comparable 
leadership on the part of lawyers, or a disposition of the public to place 
reliance upon their leadership where the problems of government touch 
the law. 
We cannot brush aside this lay dissatisfaction with lawyers with the 
comforting assurance that it is nothing more than the chronic distrust 
of the lawyer class which the literature of every age has portrayed. It is, 
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I fear, the expression of a belief too general and too firmly held for us to 
shut our eyes to it. One might cite a hundred examples but it suffices 
that in the struggle, unique in our history, to determine whether the 
giant economic forces which our industrial and financial world have 
created shall be brought under some larger measure of control and, if so, 
what legal devices can and should be selected to accomplish that end, it 
is a matter of public comment that the practicing lawyer has been but a 
minor participant. It is unnecessary, and it would be unbecoming for me 
to express any opinion upon the merits of that controversy or the 
methods of its solution. It is enough for present purposes that in one of 
the most critical periods of our history, when a major public problem 
is the choice of remedies for our economic ills and the mutual adjust­
ment and reconciliation of those remedies with legal doctrine, the prac­
ticing Bar of the nation has not attained its accustomed place of recog­
nized leadership. Unless in this time of self-searching we are to abandon 
the lawyer's habit of facing the realities of the world in which we live 
and rest content to dwell on the happier recollections of another day, we 
cannot avoid asking ourselves how our past, and the ideals which claim 
our attachment, are to be reconciled with the disquieting circumstances 
of our present, or whether the donor of this beneficent gift for the public 
good was mistaken in his judgment that we may look to the legal pro­
fession more than to other groups in our society for future public 
leadership. 
The coercive power of the state no doubt has its part to play in any 
civilization. We cannot do without the policeman, yet we cannot count 
his night stick as our most potent civilizing agency. In seeking solutions 
for our social and economic maladjustments we are too ready to place 
our reliance on what the state may command, rather than on what may 
be given to it as the free offering of good citizenship, forgetting that 'in 
doing so we give first place to the policeman's club. Yet we know that 
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unless the urge of individual advantage has other curbs, unless we may 
have recourse to other forces of social betterment, and unless the more 
influential elements in society conduct themselves with a disposition to 
promote the common good, society cannot function. This is the more 
so in a society which has largely measured its rewards in terms of mate­
rial gains. For as our conception of what is reward is less related to the 
social welfare the problem of bringing individual conduct into harmony 
with the demands of society becomes more acute, and in the economy of 
today mere material gain to the individual may not in itself be the social 
good it was once conceived to be. 
Throughout the history of Anglo-American civilization, the pro­
fessional groups have been among the most significant of those non­
governmental agencies which promote the public welfare. Although in 
smaller measure, during the rapid growth of our industrial system, their 
function has been not unlike that of the medieval guilds. They have 
exerted direct control over their members by training, by selection, by 
punishment, by reward. Among these groups the position of the Bar 
has been one of peculiar importance and significance. While it has not 
inherited the completely independent status of the English Bar, to no 
other group in this country has the state granted comparable privileges 
or permitted so much autonomy. No other is so closely related to the 
state, and no other has traditionally exerted so powerful an influence on 
public opinion and on public policy. That influence in the past has been 
wielded chiefly in the courts, in the forums of local communities, in legis­
lative halls, in the councils of government. In all its varying aspects, it 
has been most potent when public questions have been closely associated 
with legal questions in whose discussion the lawyer was peculiarly at 
home, and when, with a developed consciousness of its social responsi­
bility, it was inevitable that the Bar should draw upon all its special 
knowledge and skill and its resourcefulness for their solution. 
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In appraising the present-day relationship of the lawyer to his com­
munity, we cannot leave out of account either the altered character of 
public questions or the change in the function which the lawyers, as a 
class, have been called upon to perform. It was in r8o9 when Jefferson 
wrote: "We are a rural farming people; we have little business and few 
manufactures among us, and I pray God it will be a long time before we 
have much of either." Profound changes have come into American life 
since that sentence was penned. The first half of the nineteenth century 
saw the beginnings of a shift from that idyllic scene and in the second 
half the transformation was complete from a young nation made up of 
isolated groups of agricultural pioneer communities, scattered through 
the vast territory east of the Mississippi River, to an industrial state, in 
which, in our own day, we have witnessed the domination of law and 
politics by inexorable economic forces. Public problems are no longer 
exclusively questions of individual right. They involve an understanding 
of the new and complex economic forces we have created, their bearing 
upon and their relationship to the lives of individuals in widely sepa­
rated communities engaged in widely differing activities, and the adapta­
tion to those forces of old conceptions of law developed in a different 
environment to meet different needs. 
The American Bar, like most other elements in the life of the nation, 
was ill prepared for a change so swift and sweeping. From the beginning 
of the commercial expansion in England to almost our own day, the 
problems of the law were those of an intensely individualistic society. 
An adequate technique, and skill in using it, engaged the attention of its 
practitioners. Its historical background and moral content, and more or 
less abortive attempts to reform its procedure, were the chief considera­
tions of its philosophers. When the universities, but a little more than 
a generation ago, found place for its study, its expositors were at first 
mainly concerned with its precedents and its technique. There was a 
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persistent delving into its past, an a?siduous analysis of what courts had 
done and the manner of their doing it, but little reflection upon the 
relationship of the law to the social and economic forces which produce 
it or contemplation of its function as a means of social control rather 
than as an end in itself. 
There was still less perception of the significance of the rise of new 
forces in American life which, with constantly accelerated speed, were 
reconstructing society upon an economic basis, with an ever-increasing 
interdependence of its every group and part upon every other. 
The changed character of the lawyer's work has made it difficult for 
him to contemplate his function in its new setting, to see himself and 
his occupation in proper perspective. No longer does his list of clients 
represent a cross section of society; no longer do his contacts make him 
the typical representative and interpreter of his community. The demands 
of practice are more continuous and exacting. He has less time for reflec­
tion upon other than immediate professional undertakings. He is more 
the man of action, less the philosopher and less the student of history, 
economics and government. 
The rise of big business has produced an inevitable specialization of 
the Bar. The successful lawyer of our day more often than not is the 
proprietor or general manager of a new type of factory, whose legal 
product is increasingly the result of mass production methods. More 
and more the amount of his income is the measure of professional suc­
cess. More and more he must look for his rewards to the material satis­
factions derived from profits, as from a successfully conducted business, 
rather than to the intangible and indubitably more durable satisfactions 
which are to be found in professional service more consciously directed 
toward the advancement of the public interest. Steadily the best skill and 
capacity of the profession has been drawn into the exacting and highly 
specialized service of business and finance. At its best the changed system 
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has brought to the command of the business world loyalty and a superb 
proficiency and technical skill. At its worst it has made the learned pro­
fession of an earlier day the obsequious servant of business, and tainted 
it with the morals and manners of the market place in its most anti-social 
manifestations. In any case we must concede that it has given us a Bar 
whose leaders, like its rank and file, are on the whole less likely to be 
well rounded professional men than their predecessors, whose energy 
and talent for public service and for bringing the law into harmony with 
changed conditions have been largely absorbed in the advancement of 
the interests of clients. 
These changes have come upon us by imperceptible stages and almost 
unrecognized. There has been no concerted effort of lawyers to bring 
them about. Indeed, it cannot be said that they have been welcome to 
the Bar, though one may doubt whether it could have resisted them 
successfully, or whether it could have met the new demands upon it 
except by some form of specialization necessarily involving a more or 
less one-sided development of the profession as a whole. 
I mention these changes now, not to condemn, but to describe them. 
We can hardly suppose that they have not come to stay in something 
like their present form, or that such evils as they have brought can be 
combatted without intelligent action, taken with full knowledge of the 
facts. Facts are stubborn but revealing things, and the first step toward 
any form of social improvement is frank recognition of them. When we 
know the significant facts in the professional life of the lawyers of the 
present generation and appraise them in the light of the altered world in 
which we live, we shall better understand how it is that a Bar which has 
done so much to develop and refine the technique of business organiza­
tion, to provide skilfully devised methods for financing industry, which 
has guided a world wide commercial expansion, has relatively done so 
little to remedy the evils of the investment market; so little to adapt the 
Dedicatory Exercises 
fiduciary principle of nineteenth century equity to twentieth century 
business practices; so little to improve the functioning of the adminis­
trative mechanisms which modern government sets up to prevent abuses; 
so little to make law more readily available as an instrument of justice 
to the common man. 
Notwithstanding all the pressures of modern economic life upon the 
lawyer, and his absorption with the demands of client-caretaking, w� 
could make no greater mistake than to assume that ours has become a 
profession without ideals. Even the lawyer's devotion to the interests of 
his clients is a manifestation of a selfless loyalty to an ideal, though it 
may not always be seen in true perspective in relation to the public in­
terests which it is also his duty to serve. No one fan1iliar with the history 
of the Bar, knowing its life and personnel, can doubt that it has the 
idealism, the will to sacrifice, the capacity for leadership, which will con­
tinue to enable it to play well its part. No professional class has greater 
pride in its traditions or higher aspirations for its future. None will 
respond more willingly, with generous expenditure of time and effort, to 
the intelligent call for action. But none so much needs to know the 
facts which reveal, in clear relief, its altered position in the social struc­
ture and the manner in which under new conditions it is meeting its 
public responsibilities. None, unless it be the scientists, can be more 
profoundly moved by facts. 
But like most other elements of the community we are in a sense the 
victims of change·s, of whose nature and effect we are still not wholly 
aware. Hence it is that the Bar needs to know and to focus its attention 
upon the facts, not in the form of assumptions or generalizations, nor 
yet on the details of petty misconduct in its disreputable outer fringes, 
but upon data patiently assembled and organized so as to show with the 
powerful impact of revealed truth the extent to which devotion to 
private interests has obscured our vision of the public welfare. I pass over 
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more familiar criticisms, to an example even more significant though less . 
well recognized and appreciated. 
I venture to assert that when the history of the financial era which has 
just drawn to a close comes to be written, most of its mistakes and its 
major faults will be ascribed to the failure to observe the fiduciary prin­
ciple, the precept as old as holy writ, that "a man cannot serve two 
masters." More than a century ago equity gave a hospitable reception to 
that principle and the common law was not slow to follow in giving it 
recognition. No thinking man can believe that an economy built upon 
a business foundation can permanently endure without some loyalty to 
that principle. The separation of ownership from management, the 
development of the corporate structure so as to vest in small groups 
control over the resources of great numbers of small and uninformed 
investors, make imperative a fresh and active devotion to that principle 
if the modern world of business is tb perform its proper function. Yet 
those who serve nominally as trustees, but relieved by clever legal 
devices from the obligation to protect those whose interests they pur­
port to represent, corporate officers and directors who award to them­
selves huge bonuses from corporate funds without the assent or even 
the knowledge of their stockholders, reorganization committees created 
to serve interests of others than those whose securities they control, 
financial institutions, which, in the infinite variety of their operations, 
consider only last, if at all, the interests of those whose funds they 
command, suggest how far we have ignored the necessary implications 
of that principle. The loss and suffering inflicted on individuals, the 
harm done to a social order reared upon a business base and dependent 
upon its integrity, are incalculable. 
There is little to suggest that the Bar has yet recognized that it must 
bear some burden of responsibility for these evils. But when we know 
and face the facts, we shall have to acknowledge that such departures from 
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the fiduciary principle do not usually occur without the active assistance 
of some member of our profession, and that their increasing recurrence 
would have been impossible but for the complaisance of a Bar too 
absorbed in the workaday care of private interests to take account of 
these events of profound import or to sound the warning that the 
profession looks askance upon these as things that ''are not done.'' 
We must remember, nevertheless, that the very conditions which 
have caused specialization, which have drawn so heavily upon the 
technical proficiency of the Bar, have likewise placed it in a position 
where the possibilities of its influence are almost beyond calculation. 
The intricacies of business organization are built upon a legal framework 
which the current growth of administrative law is still further elabo­
rating. Without the constant advice and guidance of lawyers, business 
would come to an abrupt halt. And whatever standards of conduct in 
the performance of its function the Bar consciously adopts must at 
once be reflected in the character of the world of business and finance. 
Given a measure of self-conscious and cohesive professional unity, the 
Bar may exert a power more beneficent and far reaching than it or any 
other non-governmental group has wielded in the past. 
If you think I have sketched too dark a picture of the difficulties 
which beset us, I hasten to assure you that it is not from any counsel of 
despair. I would only point out that in the new order which has been 
forced upon us, we cannot expect the Bar to function as it did in other 
days and under other conditions. Before it can function at all as the 
guardian of public interests committed to its care, there must be 
appraisal and comprehension of the new conditions and the changed 
relationship of the lawyer to his clients, to his professional brethren 
and to the public. That appraisal must pass beyond the petty details 
of form and manners which have been so largely the subject of our 
codes of ethics, to more fundamental consideration of the way in 
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which our professional activities affect the welfare of society as a 
whole. Our canons of ethics for the most part are generalizations de­
signed for an earlier era. However undesirable the practices con­
demned, they do not profoundly affect the social order outside our 
own group. We must not permit our attention to the relatively in­
consequential to divert us from preparing to set appropriate standards 
for those who design the legal patterns for business practices of far 
more consequence to society than any with which our grievance com­
mittees have been preoccupied. 
Aside from the procedure of formulating new methods of dis­
cipline and new specifications of condemned practices, we must give 
more thoughtful consideration to squaring our own ethical concep­
tions with the traditional ethics and ideals of the community at large. 
The problems to which the machine and the corporation give rise have 
outstripped the ideology and values of an earlier day. The future de­
mands that we undergo a corresponding moral readjustment. Just as the 
lawyers of 17 9 o to 184 o took a leading part in fashioning the country's 
ideals to suit political change, so we must now shoulder the task of 
relating them to business and economic change. 
All this cannot be done in those occasional and brief intervals when 
the busy lawyer secures some respite from the pressing demands of 
clients to participate in the festivities of bar association meetings. It 
requires study and investigation, the painstaking gathering of data and 
their portrayal in such fashion that we may know the facts and, knowing 
them, develop a consciousness of their implications for our profession. 
With so much to be done w� must look to those elements in the 
profession best qualified for doing it. A generation ago that search must 
have begun and ended with practicing lawyers. But paralleling the de­
velopment of the practicing bar has come, in the past fifty years, the 
steady growth in public esteem and influence of a new force in American 
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legal life, that of the rapidly increasing group of university law teachers, 
devoting their lives to the task of advancing the cause of legal science 
for which they have been specially selected and trained. 
Members of the Bar, they nevertheless make up a distinct profes­
sional group within the Bar. More detached than is the barrister from 
the absorbing demands of clients and from those pressures of the new 
economic order which have so profoundly affected their practicing 
brethren, their approach to legal problems has been that of the dis­
interested scientist. For a generation they contented themselves with. 
the necessary work of analysis, clarification and statement of legal doc­
trine. More recently, with penetrating insight, they have expanded their 
inquiries to embrace the relation of law to the social forces which create 
it, and which in turn it is designed to control. Today they are beginning 
to turn their attention to the Bar as an institution, seeking to gain an 
informed understanding of its problems, to appraise the performance of 
its public functions and to find ways of stimulating a more adequate 
performance of them. In all this they have rendered and are rendering 
a public service of a high order. 
With the ever increasing demands on the time and energy of the 
practicing lawyer, it was but natural that it should fall to the lot of the 
law school men to take the lead in discharging the public duties which 
rest on the profession as a whole. It is they who have taken the initiative 
in the most important reforms undertaken by the Bar in the past twenty 
years. They originated and have chiefly guided the movements espoused 
by the Bar for the enactment of uniform laws, the restatement of the 
law, the improvement in standards of admission to the Bar, and the 
reform of civil and criminal procedure. It is they who today represent 
the most cohesive, disinterested and potent single force operating within 
the profession to establish its public relationships on a higher plane. The 
donor of this great educational center, in formulating his forward-
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looking plan, was not unfamiliar with this recent history of our pro­
fession. He made no mistake in recognizing the law schools as an im­
portant factor in it. Neither was he mistaken, I am convinced, in the 
assumption, implicit in words, that the future would see the Bar 
increasingly influenced by the work of the schools. 
And so I turn to the part which our university law schools may take 
in the study and promotion of the highest interests of the Bar. The 
functioning of the Bar as an essential institution in present day Ameri­
can life is worthy of research and exposition for the enlightenment of 
the Bar and the public, such as only they can make. Their detachment, 
their scholarly resources, their growing influence with the Bar, all indi­
cate plainly enough that it is they who must take the more active part in 
solving the problems which weigh upon our profession perhaps as 
never before. They, as can no others, may assemble and portray the 
facts which reveal, so that all may see, the manner in which the Bar is 
performing its functions and, portraying them, stir the latent idealism 
of lawyers to carry on. 
It is equally true that the Bar cannot sit by and leave the burden 
entirely upon the law schools. In the light of information which they 
may make available the Bar must assume the responsibility of consciously 
bringing its conduct to conform to new standards fitting the times in 
which we live. And unless history reverses itself the cooperation and 
support of leaders of the Bar will not be wanting. There could be no 
more reassuring example of the possibility of drawing upon the re­
serves of wisdom, patriotism and idealism of our profession in a coopera­
tive effort to advance the public interest than that afforded by the 
Institute of Law. For more than ten years the judges, the leading practi­
tioners of the country and the representatives of our great schools of law 
have united in the sustained, self-sacrificing, harmonious effort of the 
Institute to bring order out of the chaos of some six centuries' accumula-
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tion of judicial precedent. One cannot doubt that a profession capable 
of such a demonstration of its capacity for united and disinterested 
public service can meet and solve these new and difficult problems. 
Nor will such an effort want for public support. The lawyer in 
America has reached his highest position in public esteem when public 
questions have been in some degree identified with the forms of legal 
right with which he is most familiar. The historic controversies, which 
bore fruit in the bill of rights, the struggle against taxation without 
representation, for immunity from arbitrary searches and seizures and 
from writs of assistance, for the freedom of the press, for trial by 
jury, involved questions with which the lawyers of the time, by training, 
experience and inclination, were peculiarly fitted to deal. Public ques­
tions were those with which the lawyer was most familiar. Today anti­
social business practices which have not yet met with our refusal to 
countenance them are equally in the public thought. It is true that the 
parallel to the earlier era is not precise, for many of these practices are 
still within the law, and to stand against them it is necessary that we 
do more than defend legal rights, and that we look beyond the club of 
the policeman as a civilizing agency to the sanctions of professional 
standards which condemn the doing of what the law has not yet for­
bidden. But in taking such a stand we may count upon the same support 
which the lawyers of that earlier era had from the lay world. It was no 
more vital to that day that free speech should be preserved than it is to 
our own that those who act as fiduciaries in the strategic positions of our 
business civilization should be held to those standards of scrupulous 
fidelity which society has the right to demand. 
There is opportunity, too, for a new emphasis in the training of the 
young men who, thronging the lecture rooms of the law schools today, 
will give character and direction to our profession tomorrow. From the 
beginning the law schools have steadily raised their intellectual stand-
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ards. It is not too much to say that they have worshipped the pro­
ficiency which they have sought and attained to a remarkable degree. 
But there is grave danger to the public if this proficiency be directed 
wholly to private ends without thought of social consequences, and 
we may well pause to consider whether the professional school has done 
well to neglect so completely the inculcation of some knowledge of the 
social responsibility which rests upon public profession. I do not refer 
to the teaching of professional ethics. I have no thought that men are 
made moral by the mere formulation of rules of conduct, no matter 
how solemnly bar associations may pronounce them, or that they may 
be made good by mere exhortation. But men serve causes because of 
their devotion to them. The zeal of the student for proficiency in the 
law, like that of his elder brother at the Bar, comes from a higher source 
than selfishness. It is devotion to his conception of a useful and worthy 
institution. But that conception is a distorted one if it envisages only 
the cultivation of skill without thought of how and to what end it is to 
be used, and the question what the law schools have done and can do to 
make that conception truer is one to be pondered upon and answered. 
It is not beyond the power of institutions which have so successfully 
mastered the art of penetrating all the intricacies of legal doctrine to 
impart a truer understanding of the functions of those who are to be 
the servants of the law. That understanding will come, not from 
platitudinous exhortation, but from knowledge of the consequences of 
the failure of a profession to bear its social responsibilities, and what it is 
doing and may do to meet them. 
And so I recur to the question which I raised a little time ago, 
whether William W. Cook, the donor of this legal center and the 
graduate and devoted friend of this University, was right in his belief 
that we can continue to look to the Bar for the preservation and de­
velopment of American institutions, and I answer it confidently in the 
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affirmative. It will realize that expectation as he contemplated that it 
would, through the growing influence of the law schools, whose char­
acter, as he declared, determines the character of the legal profession 
and through closer association and cooperation of this and other 
schools of law in the worthy task of building up a new morale in the 
profession, fitted to the new conditions under which it must do its 
work. It is a happy augury for the future that the central idea around 
which this institution, so nobly conceived, has been built is that the 
continued capacity of the profession to guide the development of 
American institutions involves an educational process in which its 
schools rightly have their part. 
* * 
* 
A MESSAGE FROM MR . J USTICE HOL ME S  
EACH stone plays its essential part in the total beauty of the buildings which you are today dedicating. In a similar way each legal institution, no matter how humble, contributes something 
to the structure of the law. But just as a planned grouping of certain 
stones imparts an especial dignity to these buildings, so we must 
appreciate the peculiar value to the law of such institutions as Michi­
gan's Law School. May your new buildings for the years to come nobly 
serve their high purpose. 
Address 
By JAMES 0. MURFIN 
Regent of the University of Michigan 
BY THE University of Michigan this memorable day will long be cherished. For our Law School it is epoch making. We do not wish to be unduly boastful but are all supremely happy in 
the conscious realization of the fact that thanks to the benefaction of 
W. W. Cook we have a Law School equipment surpassed by none. Nor 
is it in stone and mortar that our pride is planted-not more than in the 
endowment which comes with this wonderful gift which, of course, in 
time will be of incalculable value in advancing the science of legal educa­
tion and this is a science. Rather our pleasurable satisfaction should 
come to us because the Cook gift, its motive and its planned method of 
operation have already created that intangible, non-definable condition 
known as atmosphere. 
There is already in and around our Law Quadrangle an atmosphere 
that makes for the best thought; it makes for zest; it makes for a desire 
to live up to the surroundings in which the student is located; and it 
gives the study of law a morale that is marvelously beneficial. 
While we are happy that Mr. Cook chose his Alma Mater as the 
laboratory for his experiment our joy must not blind us to his motives 
and our obvious duty. This gift was not primarily to our Law School as 
such. It was not a gift backed by legal education as its primary thought. 
Instead it was a gift designed and planned to benefit his Country, our 
Country, the United States of America. It was his firm belief that the 
future welfare of America depended upon the legal profession. His 
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reading and his study led him to this conclusion. That was a fixed 
opinion in his mind. He had entertained that opinion for .many years. 
It was therefore not primarily for his profession that this gift was made 
-it was for his Country. He believed the outstanding American insti­
tutions, peculiar to our genesis and development, which have made our 
country so outstanding, came into being and were largely preserved by 
lawyers. He expected and hoped that lawyers would continue to carry 
on in the future as he believed they had in the past. He fully believed in 
the necessity of the Bar continuing to be leaders in the affairs of our 
Country. Because of this belief he wanted to produce the best lawyers 
possible-lawyers with the best education, the best background; he 
wanted to aid and improve legal education; he wanted the law student 
to have the best surroundings possible; he wanted to encourage and develop 
the highest type of law study, but his primary motive in this benefac­
tion was to produce better citizens and better servants for his Country. 
With his high ideal before us should we not pause in the midst of our 
pleasure and contemplate our duty? Are we to stop with a day of cele­
bration? Are we going to be content with mere .contemplation? Rather, I 
think, the Bar of America, the Bar of his Country, the Bar whose banner 
we proudly carry, should individually here and now pause and in that 
pause think of the background of this magnificent gift. We should then 
and now dedicate part of our future action and part of our future lives 
to aid with all in our power in carrying out this magnificent ideal. 
. Our profession is still under public criticism. This is nothing new. 
Hamlet, soliloquizing three hundred years ago, about the slings and 
arrows of outrageous fortune, includes the bar as one of his major com­
plaints. We all know there is some ground for complaint. There is 
ground for complaint because there is always room for improvement. 
Let us use this occasion-let us use the ideal of our donor as an oppor­
tunity to pledge ourselves that every day and every way we will strive to 
serve our Country better. 
A Research Problem 
Separation of Powers 
By MARVIN B.  R OSENBERRY 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
IN THE nature of things William W. Cook must have pondered many alternatives over the years which preceded his final determina­tion to place his residuary estate in the hands of trustees for the 
purpose of advancing the study of law upon this Campus. He had 
devoted practically his entire life to the practice and study of the law. He 
had had most unusual opportunities to observe law in action. In the 
course of his professional career he had dealt almost exclusively with 
corporate organization and corporate finance. He had been a close-up 
observer of the development of the modern corporation, a device which 
has made possible the unprecedented economic development of this 
country and at the same time created social problems of the most 
difficult and complex character known to government. He had come in 
contact not only with the leaders of the bar but with leaders in the fields 
of industry, transportation and finance. His practice disclosed to him 
the fact that many men in positions of leadership were not trained to 
lead. Waiving the question of whether or not leaders can be discovered 
and developed in schools, there remains the undeniable fact that a 
trained leader is far better than one of equal natural ability, with 
approximately the same experience, who is untrained. Mr. Cook would 
have been the last to confine training to schooling. But the schools do 
something in the way of training which practical experience does not 
do. No doubt the converse is also true. 
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While by the terms of the trust created by his will Mr. Cook gave 
great latitude both to his trustees and to the beneficiary of the trust, it 
is quite apparent from his scanty writings dealing with the matter, that 
he had for many years sensed the fact that the law of this country would 
shortly undergo profound changes. In recognition of this fact he first 
determined to devote his fortune to the development of trained leaders 
who might assist in directing through the teaching, practice and study 
of the law, the operation of those social forces which he realized were 
acting with increasing pressure upon our fundamental law. Having 
made this basic decision, his second step was to decide that the leader­
ship which he deemed essential to the continuity of our institutions 
could best be developed in connection with an established law school. 
When he had made these two decisions, he must have canvassed with 
great thoroughness the possibilities in connection with various estab­
lished institutions. In his search for the most strategic position for his 
purposes, he naturally considered his Alma Mater. However, accustomed 
as he was to deal with facts and realities, it is probable that mere senti­
ment had little to do with his ultimate selection. It is noteworthy that 
he finally chose an institution, which was, first, in the great Middle 
West; second, tax-supported and administered by a state; third, closely 
associated with a great university; fourth, having a faculty with a long 
history of achievement in the field of legal education; and fifth, one 
with a great body of loyal alumni who came from many foreign 
countries as well as from every state in the Union. 
More clearly than most lawyers engrossed in private practice, Mr. 
Cook realized the implications and possibilities of the co-ordination of 
the three great departments of the profession of the law,-teaching, 
practicing and adjudicating. He rightly believed that the first function 
of a law school is to train lawyers. But he also believed that in order to 
develop leadership individuals who show marked aptitude in the law 
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should have an available opportunity to develop more fully this special 
talent, under circumstances where practical considerations would not 
so ruthlessly reject or obscure the social implications involved as would 
be the case in private practice. 
In his practice the lawyer of necessity deals with controversies or 
situations involving doubt, relating to transactions which are being 
carried out to achieve definite ends. He therefore draws upon the law 
for that which will aid him in attaining the end sought by his client. 
He cannot weight the enterprise with considerations which in his 
judgment or in the judgment of his client may result in the loss of the 
objective sought. The judge, because he is required to decide contro­
versies promptly, must deal very largely with the legal materials 
furnished him by lawyers. While a judge may and often does have a 
full appreciation of the social implications of the case before him, he is 
obliged to proceed within strictly defined limits. It is well that this is 
uue, for social projects advanced today with great confidence and vigor 
are often rejected tomorrow because they do not work. The law can 
with safety accept only those social concepts which have withstood 
the test of experience. Moreover, time for consideration and reflection 
on the part of the judge is limited. The pressure of modern business 
creates a demand upon our courts for speedy decision which makes 
impossible except in rare cases a philosophical rationalization of the law 
of any particular case. The teacher on the other hand has a two-fold 
function. He not only instructs but he systematizes and correlates the 
material with which he deals. In doing this he criticizes not only the 
work of the lawyer but the work of the judge. He has also unusual 
opportunity for reflection, consideration and reconsideration. If he does 
not complete his investigation this year he may do it next year. Clients 
and parties are not knocking on his door demanding that he forthwith 
announce his conclusions. He may properly range the fields covered by 
LAWYERS CLUB, VIEW OF CLOISTER FROM DORMITORY WINDOW. 
72 Dedicatory Exercises 
the other social sciences. He may consult and debate with others with­
out fear of disclosing professional secrets, which were he a practicing 
lawyer or a judge, might subject either a client or a party to the risk of 
harm. He may submit his deductions to students who are keen, dis­
criminating and not inhibited by considerations of consequences or a 
fine sense of delicacy. While their judgment may not be tempered by 
experience, their range is wide and their viewpoint unclouded and 
varied. So over the years by a process of elimination and refinement the 
teacher works over his material and develops a systematic and accurate state­
ment of the law. It is not too much to say that the work of the law school 
teachers in the last forty years has given direction to and an interpretation 
of the development of our law which is of the very greatest importance. 
If in some way the skill and experience of the practitioner, the wis­
dom and poise of the judge, the scholarship, the ability to refine, and 
the power to impart knowledge of the teacher, could be focused upon a 
group of unusual, able and enthusiastic students, an important step 
would be taken in the realization of Mr. Cook's ideal. The study of the 
law in vacuo is likely to be sterile and so far detached from realities in 
the field of legislation and the administration of the law as to be almost 
without practical value. The output of the law schools in the way of 
articles and dissertations is in itself fragmentary and uncorrelated, and 
as one ponders some of these products of the cloister he may well 
wonder if they were not written to display the erudition of the writer 
and with very little knowledge of the practical working of the law in 
an every day world. One will make no reference to the work of the 
destructive and belligerent young critics who imagine themselves to be 
face to face with the beginning of a new era every time they look in the 
mirror. They will never agree and like the Kilkenny cats will shortly 
dispose of each other. 
But there comes from the law schools a body of literature that is 
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immensely worth while. Any practicing lawyer or judge who ignores it 
makes a grave error whether he be most concerned with the interests of a 
client or with the justice and soundness of a decision. The difficulty 
with this material is that it is for the most part not available in usable 
form for the lawyer, the judge or the legislator. It is detached and not 
related to the present needs of the state nor is it immediately helpful to 
the bar or to the courts. It has value but the same effort might produce 
material of much greater usefulness. Much of it is speculative or so 
highly controversial as to require restatement to reduce it to a usable 
form. On the other hand that which deals with problems which are 
before courts and legislatures for solution often presents dispassionately 
and accurately the present state and trend of the law in a way that makes 
it very valuable. 
It is not too much to hope that here upon this Campus there may be 
developed a method of co-ordinating the work of the teachers, the 
lawyers and the judges in such form that it may be understandable and 
usable not only by members of the bar but by legislators and those who 
deal with the content of the other social sciences. It is quite probable 
that Mr. Cook had something of this kind in mind. The endowment 
created by him offers to the faculty of the Law School of the University 
of Michigan a great opportunity for leadership as well as for the 
development of leaders. 
To be more specific, the work already done under the direction of 
members of the faculty of the Law School of this University in pro­
posing a revised code of procedure for the State of Michigan and in 
making available for legislative committees elsewhere the result of 
researches in the law of practice and procedure and the annotation of the 
restatement of the law of contracts, illustrates in a very striking way the 
possibilities of worthwhile achievement. Research which grows out of 
and is connected with the living stem of the law is of much greater 
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present value than if it be detached and floating so to speak in legal 
space. 
Mr. Cook's plans are being realized at a time which is most oppor­
tune. He was undoubtedly a man of great foresight and must have had 
a very keen appreciation of the fact that a great change in the law was 
imminent; but we should be obliged to endow him with the attribute of 
truly prophetic insight if we were to say that he foresaw anything like 
the present shift in our legal order involving as it does not only the 
application of constitutional principles to new situations but also the 
relation of the states to the federal government and a redistribution of 
the police power between them. The questions of law raised by the 
proposals which have been put into operation during the last two 
years and by those now being put forward are of the most fundamental 
character. It is quite probable, judging by the past, that the extent of the 
shift will not be so great as many now suppose; it will nevertheless be 
significant. It is possible that what now currently passes for change is 
nothing more than an appreciation by the public of the fact that many 
changes have already been made, which have heretofore escaped notice. 
The constitution of any state at best marks merely a beginning, -a 
time when fundamental principles are declared and direction given to 
the future development of law and government. The men who for­
mulated the federal constitution well understood this fact. They recog­
nized much more clearly than many of their successors the fact that law 
and government are growing and constantly developing institutions and 
are therefore subject to change and adaptation. Constitutional principles 
are analogous to the range lights which guide the mariner. They mark 
out a safe course but that does not mean that the first course laid out is 
and must always remain the best course. 
It is well within the truth to say that since the period of the ci vii war, 
there has been a growing indifference to fundamental constitutional 
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principles. Such interest as there has been was the result of definite 
economic and social rather than purely political pressure. Because of 
this widespread lack of interest many actual changes have escaped popu­
lar notice. The great body of decision relating to the exercise of the 
police power by the federal government affords an excellent illustration 
of the situation. More than twenty years of experience at the bar and 
nearly as many on the bench have emphasized to my mind the necessity 
of re-establishing the validity and importance of constitutional prin­
ciples in the mind of the general public. 
Within the limited time available it would be impossible to sketch 
even in barest outline the changes and adaptations of the constitution 
other than by amendment which have taken place in the one hundred 
and forty years since its adoption. Without attempting in any way to 
discuss the merits or demerits of the doctrine, either in theory or prac­
tice, we may briefly, by way of illustration, consider that body of 
political and constitutional principles ordinarily associated under the 
tide, "Separation of Powers. " 
The general notion that a citizen could not adequately be protected 
in the enjoyment of his liberties unless the legislative, executive and 
judicial powers were exercised by different persons or groups of per­
sons, seems to have originated with Aristotle. Its greatest expositor, 
however, was Montesquieu. His treatise "The Spirit of Laws" became 
current in the English-speaking world in the earlier decades of· the 
eighteenth century and had a profound influence upon the political 
thought of that day. It had a wide reading in the American colonies and 
its influence upon our political thinking has persisted down to our own 
time. 
The English people including the colonists had been subjected in 
turn to the tyranny of the executive, to unlawful exactions by the 
legislative, and to usurpations by the judicial branch of the government. 
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It was natural therefore that those who formulated the constitutions of 
the original thirteen states and of the United States should have re­
garded the separation of powers as of prime importance and in order 
firmly to establish it, should have adopted the theory as a working 
principle of constitutional law. In France and England the doctrine has 
always remained a matter of political theory, where it has guided and 
directed rather than controlled political action. But in the United 
States, when in 1787 the constitution was submitted to the people of 
the States for their rejection or approval, the principal objection made 
to it was that it did not declare in definite terms that the legislative, 
executive and judicial departments ought to be separate and distinct. In 
reply to this criticism, James Madison pointed out in The Federalist 
that while no political truth was of greater intrinsic value or was 
stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty than 
that on which the objection was found, nevertheless neither in England 
nor in the constitutions adopted by the colonies were these depart­
ments totally separate and distinct from each other. He cited the 
constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in which the 
doctrine was expressed as follows: 
"In the government of this Commonwealth the legislative depart­
ment shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers or either of 
them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial pow­
ers or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the executive 
and legislative powers or either of them; to the end it may be a gov­
ernment of laws and not of men.'' 
He quoted from Jefferson's "Notes on the State of Virginia," as 
follows: 
"All the powers of Government, Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary, 
result to the Legislative body. The concentrating of these in the same 
hands is precisely the definition of despotic Government. It will be no 
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alleviation, that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, 
and not by a single one. One hundred seventy-three despots would 
surely be as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt it, turn their eyes 
to the Republic of Venice. As little will it avail us, that they are chosen 
by ourselves. An elective despotism was not the Government we fought 
for; but one which should not only be founded on free principles, but 
in which the powers of Government should be so divided and balanced 
among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend 
their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by 
the others. For this reason, that Convention which passed the ordinance 
of Government, laid its foundation on this basis, that the Legislative, 
Executive, and Judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, 
so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them 
at the same time." 
That the framers of the constitution as well as the people of the 
several states considered the exercise of the separate powers by distinct 
persons or groups as vitally necessary to the preservation of the rights 
guaranteed by the constitution admits of no doubt. The doctrine was 
indeed so generally accepted by the various departments of government 
that it was scarcely drawn in question down to the time of the civil war. 
John Marshall, the great expounder of the constitution, although he 
was a member of the Supreme Court of the United States for more 
than a third of a century, was never called upon to deal in concrete 
form with this question. Even in the states controversies involving the 
doctrine arose in rare instances and then only in connection with 
matters which were relatively unimportant. 
But experience demonstrated not only that the legislative branch of 
the government could not deal effectively with all of the complex 
factual situations which confronted it; it also further appeared that the 
judicial branch of the government was not so organized as to deal with 
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matters which were really more administrative than judicial; and we 
began to move away step by step from our original position, although 
at first the line of cleavage was barely perceptible. 
The creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 may 
be taken as well as any other date for the point of departure from the 
accepted doctrine of the separation of powers. In the beginning the 
Interstate Commerce Commission was little more than an extra­
legislative committee charged with the duty of inquiring into and find­
ing the facts with reference to certain aspects of the transportation 
problem. It reported not to Congress but to the Secretary of the 
Interior and its findings were communicated to Congress by the executive. 
But in a short time it became clear that if the Interstate Commerce 
Commission was to be an effective agency in the solution of the prob­
lems presented to Congress, it must have powers much wider than 
those which had at first been granted to it. 
Fifty years ago in order to kill any legislative measure which by its 
terms proposed to endow administrative agencies with rule-making or 
fact-finding powers, it was sufficient to point out that the proposed 
measure delegated legislative or judicial power and was therefore un­
constitutional. The necessary first steps away from the accepted doctrine 
were frowned upon by the courts and taken in the face of many diffi­
culties and with many misgivings. Gradually, however, the pressure 
became so great and the need of supplementing the legislative and 
judicial branches of the government so apparent that finally the attempt 
to evade or hurdle the constitutional barriers was successful. 
How, if all governmental power was vested in the three great depart­
ments of government, were the new administrative tribunals to be 
given enough authority to make them effective? From what source 
was the power to be drawn? The doctrine was all-inclusive-no govern­
mental power was lying around unappropriated. Many ingenious de-
So Dedicatory Exercises 
vices were evolved by means of which it was hoped the constitutional 
restraints might be avoided. Finally under the guise of conferring upon 
administrative tribunals the power to find facts, grants of power which 
passed the judicial test were made. Although the powers granted to 
such tribunals were in fact equivalent to judicial power, the grant was 
stated in terms which obscured the real nature of the power conferred. 
To these same administrative tribunals was also delegated the power 
to make so-called orders or rules principally in the form of safety codes, 
building codes, health codes, electrical codes and other similar bodies of 
rules, all of which have the force and effect of law. The power to 
promulgate a rule for a violation of which a citizen may be punished 
is in fact legislative power. There has thus in fact been a delegation of 
judicial and legislative power to administrative tribunals with the 
result that the same body which makes the law determines whether or 
not the law has been broken and also imposes the penalty therefor. The 
fact that these tribunals were in the beginning and to a large extent still 
are manned by trained lawyers and adopt so far as is practical court 
procedure, has up to the present time prevented most of the undesirable 
consequences which Jefferson and his contemporaries feared would flow 
from an exercise of judicial and legislative powers in combination. This 
was quite generally true down to March, 1933. That it is still true can­
not be alleged with so much confidence. 
One important consideration in this connection, however, seems to 
have escaped public notice. The fact is that judicial power when 
exercised by an administrative tribunal escapes the restraints imposed 
by the constitution upon the manner of its exercise. From the beginning 
it has been held that all courts exercising judicial power must as re­
gards fundamentals exercise it according to the course of the common 
law so that no citizen may be deprived of his liberty or property except 
by due process of law. It is true that due process was not defined in the 
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constitution; but when a court was created by constitution or statute, 
it was held to be a court as that institution including its procedure was 
known to the common law. Many state constitutions in addition re­
quired that the writ of error sho�ld never be abolished, thereby securing 
to parties a right of review. But the procedure of the administrative 
tribunal is not according to the course of the common law; it is ordi­
narily prescribed by the tribunal itself. While in certain instances judicial 
power is exercised by administrative tribunals in conformity to the 
common law, in many other respects its procedure has necessarily been 
of a summary character. A significant and growing tendency to abuse 
appears in efforts which have been and are being made to prevent a 
review of findings of fact made by administrative tribunals, even 
though they may be clearly against the great weight of the evidence and 
supported only by a scintilla of proof. In the great majority of cases the 
rights of interested parties to a controversy are for all practical purposes 
ultimately determined when the facts are found so that parties are 
denied an effective right of review where findings of fact are made con­
clusive upon the courts. 
When an administrative tribunal in the exercise of its so-called rule­
making power prescribes a rule of conduct for a citizen which rule may 
be enforced in a court, it to all intents and purposes exercises legislative 
power. When a law in the form of a rule is established by the order of 
an administrative tribunal, the law-making power escapes all con­
stitutional restraint as to the manner of its exercise. Practically every 
constitution in this country provides for two branches of the legislature; 
for the introduction and reading of bills which are then customarily 
referred to committees, reported back and debated. After a bill has been 
passed by one house it must be concurred in by the other house and 
when concurred in must be submitted to the executive for his approval. 
But the administrative tribunal may without a hearing, without sub-
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mitring proposals, without debate and of its own motion declare a rule 
which has the force of law. Thus the law-making power not only escapes 
constitutional restraint as to the manner of its exercise but it is exercised 
by a group over which the electorate has only a remote if any control. 
The exercise of the judicial and the legislative and the executive powers 
in combination and their exercise by persons other than those chosen at 
an election were the things most feared by Jefferson and his contem­
poraries for the fundamental reason that it was believed to be destruc­
tive of the actual democratic government which they were forming. 
The abandonment of the doctrine of separation of powers and of its 
corollary that a power once delegated may not be redelegated, has not 
come about in response to a political movement or at the behest of a 
vocal and persistent minority. It has been the result rather of steady, 
irresistible, social pressure which has arisen from the fact that govern­
ment in the last hundred years has been obliged to concern itself more 
and more with regulations designed to equalize economic opportunities 
and to bring under subjection the activities of the modern corporation. 
The forces that have operated here in the United States have operated 
along the same lines to a greater or less extent in all western countries. 
While social pressure has not resulted in similar action in each country 
some modification of previous political concepts has been necessary in 
nearly all. For very obvious reasons the situation in England most 
closely parallels that in this country. A brief statement of the situation 
there throws a great deal of light upon the situation here. 
As has already been said, in England the doctrine of the separation of 
powers has remained a matter of political theory, though any de­
parture from the doctrine in that country has met with more resistance 
than in this country. The reason is not difficult to discover. Most Amer­
icans apparently believe their constitutions when once established are 
eternal and immutable unless modified in the manner prescribed in the 
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instrument. The English people on the other hand are aware that their 
constitution depends for its preservation upon the constant vigilance of 
those who believe in its fundamental principles. Any departure there­
fore from established constitutional principles in England attracts much 
more popular attention than it does in the United States. 
Lord Hewart, Lord Chief Justice of England, has dealt with the 
subject in his book "The New Despotism. " He believes that by pro­
curing the delegation of power to government departments a despotic 
and arbitrary rule is being established in Engl�nd. While the book does 
not lend itself very well to quotation, his position may be summarized 
in his own language somewhat transposed, as follows: He says: 
"What is meant by the 'rule of law' is the supremacy or the pre­
dominance of law, as distinguished from mere arbitrariness, or from 
some alternative mode, which is not law, of determining or disposing 
of the rights of individuals. But the supremacy of law, as we know it, 
means something more than the exclusion of arbitrary power, and 
something more also than the equality of all citizens before the ordinary 
law of the land administered by the ordinary courts. A little inquiry will 
serve to show that there is now, and for some years past has been, a 
persistent influence at work which, whatever the motives or the inten­
tions that support it may be thought to be, undoubtedly has the effect 
of placing a large and increasing field of departmental authority and 
activity beyond the reach of the ordinary law. Much toil, and not a 
little blood, have been spent in bringing slowly into being a polity 
wherein the people make their laws, and independent judges administer 
them. If that edifice is to be overthrown, let the overthrow be accom­
plished openly. Never let it be said that liberty and justice, having �ith 
difficulty been won, were suffered to be abstracted or impaired in a fit of 
absence of mind. The exercise of arbitrary power is neither law nor 
justice, administrative or at all. The very conception of 'law' is a con-
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ception of something involving the application of known rules and 
principles and a regular course of procedure. There are no rules or 
principles which can be said to be rules or principles of this astonishing 
variety of administrative 'law', nor is there any regular course of 
procedure for its application.'' 
Lord Hewart envisions a return not in form but in political effect 
to the time of the Stuarts when the promulgation of law was a prerog­
ative of the crown. Despite his very vehement denunciation of the 
practice of delegation of the powers of parliament, Lord Hewart never­
theless says: 
"It is tolerably obvious that the system of delegation by Parliament 
of powers of legislation is within certain limits necessary, at least as 
regards matters of detail, because it is impossible, if only for want of 
time, for Parliament to deal adequately and in detail with all the 
matters calling, or supposed to call, for legislation. Indeed, without a 
drastic alteration of its methods of procedure, it would be impossible 
for Parliament to deal adequately with even a comparatively small part 
of the present-day volume of departmental legislation. It may also be 
conceded that the system, if not abused, and subject to proper safe­
guards, may have its uses. It is the abuse of the system that calls for 
criticisms, and perhaps the greatest abuse, and the one most likely to 
lead to arbitrary and unreasonable legislation, is the ousting of the 
jurisdiction of the Courts." 
The case for those who support the practice of delegating legislative 
power by parliament is stated by Mr. John Willis in his "Parliamentary 
Powers of English Government Departments'' and may be very briefly 
quoted in shortened form as follows: 
"Much is now expected of the State; it is no longer enough for it to 
keep the peace, it must watch over health, education, industry, trans­
port, and many other social interests. With its vast resen·es of coerci \'e 
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power and of wealth it can afford to disdain a short-sighted materialism, 
and with its far-reaching tentacles it can fasten upon sources of informa­
tion which would be denied to private business operating for private 
gain. With the changing viewpoint of the State,-and it has so changed 
because the m.ajority of voters so desired,-government naturally fell 
into the hands of officials whose function it is to build rather than to 
d " estroy. 
He continues: "One of the reasons for delegating power to make 
rules to the departments is, put shortly, to enable questions of detail 
to be removed from the consideration of Parliament. Right up to the 
middle of the nineteenth century Parliament not only took care to 
provide for every exceptional case within the purview of the Act, but 
appended schedules of forms or tables of fees . . . .  Now it was not from 
choice that Parliament obscured the generality of its enactments by a 
cloud of petty details; the Civil Service as we know it today had not 
yet been born, and there were no departments upon which to rely. But 
if a mass of cumbersome detail was not then a burden it would be a 
burden today . . . .  A glance at any volume of the Statutes will show 
that there is now a genuine attempt to state the intention of Parliament 
in plain language that shall be intelligible and unambiguous for lawyer 
and layman alike. Further, even though it were practicable for Parliament 
to give up its time to discussion of details, there is no guarantee that 
it would be competent. " 
There would be no justification for these extended quotations on this 
occasion from the works of Lord Hewart and Mr. Will is were it not 
for the fact that what is true of the development of administrative law 
in England is equally true of its development in this country. 
In both countries up to the present time criticism has been directed 
principally at the re-delegation of power vested in constitutional bodies. 
Little has as yet been said with respect to the consequences which may 
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be expected to flow from the exercise of the several powers by one and 
the same person or group. 
Montesquieu said: "The political liberty of the subject is a tran­
quillity of mind, arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. 
In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so con­
tinued as one man need not be afraid of another. 
"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same 
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; 
because apprehension may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should 
enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. 
"Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated 
from the legislative and executive powers. Were it joined with the 
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to 
arbitrary control; for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it 
joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the 
violence of an oppressor. 
''There would be an end of everything, were the same man, or the 
same body, whether of the nobles or of the people to exercise those 
three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolu­
tions, and that of judging the crimes or differences of individuals. " 
Here in concise and precise language is epitomized the whole philos­
ophy of the doctrine of separation of powers. In the beginning of our 
constitutional history, it was thought that the people by the adoption 
of the constitution had not only provided for a government of laws and 
not of men, but that they had determined how the persons by whom the 
prescribed powers would be exercised, should be chosen. If we consider 
the importance of the matters dealt with by administrative agencies 
today we shall discover that they dispose of matters of the highest im­
portance whether measured by the value of the subject-matter involved 
or by the effect of their determinations upon the social welfare of the 
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state. We have but to observe the proceedings of the Interstate Com­
merce Commission and of the Public Service Commissions of the 
various states to realize that this is the case. The personnel of these 
agencies is appointed and not elected, yet they discharge functions of 
government much more important than those performed by many 
elected officers. 
The fact that there could never be and never was in practice a com­
plete separation of the powers which fully accorded with political theory 
accounts in part for the ready acceptance of the change by the people. By 
the constitution certain judicial powers were reserved to the legislature, 
for instance the power to determine the election and qualification of its 
own members. Historically certain administrative powers were vested in 
the courts, an example of which is the power to administer a trans­
continental railway upon the theory that the administrator or the 
receiver is an arm of the court. As a matter of practical necessity of 
course every executive must in the first instance interpret and construe 
legislative enactments in order that he may take the first steps toward 
their enforcement. While this is not an exercise of a judicial power, 
such interpretations especially when long acquiesced in are given great 
weight in all branches of the government. The executive may also veto 
acts of the legislature. He may in effect set aside the judgment of a 
court by granting a pardon. No undesirable results were seen to flow 
from the exercise of these powers by the persons in whom they were 
vested. When the creation of administrative tribunals became necessary, 
if the government was to perform its functions in a changing order, it 
was but natural that in the interest of the public welfare the power 
should be lodged where it might be most conveniently and effectively 
exercised. The fears entertained by Montesquieu, Locke, Jefferson and 
those who accepted their ideas that tyranny and oppression would 
result from a combination of power, no longer existed in the public 
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mind. A century of experience under a written constitution had caused 
these fears to subside if not in fact to disappear. There was no longer an 
immediate background of political oppression such as the colonists had 
suffered. It is possible that the character of the men who exercise 
political power has so changed that the exercise of these powers in 
combination will now produce a different result from that produced in 
times gone by. It is quite generally believed, however, that human 
nature has not undergone a radical change in recent time. There are son1e 
indications that there exists a tendency in public officials of the present 
day as in public officials of two hundred years ago to act arbitrarily and 
sometimes oppressively, always of course for the purpose of achieving a 
worthy and desirable end. In this country we have had not only the crea­
tion of administrative agencies by legislative enactment and the pro­
mulgation of laws by executive proclamation but we have now a species 
of law-making by agreement of the representatives of the group which 
will be directly affected by the law when made. 
Enough has been said to indicate that there has been a very wide 
departure in practice from the political principles and concepts which 
guided our early legislators in the matter of the delegation and redistri­
bution of governmental power, and of the exercise of some of the 
powers of the three great departments in combination. It may be 
thought that too much has been said as to the merits of the question 
but some discussion is necessary to establish the importance of the 
doctrine under present day conditions. It does not appear that there has 
been a careful analysis or appraisal of the extent of this departure, nor 
what effect if any it has had upon the liberties and personal rights of 
individuals. Admitting that it was necessary to abandon the laissez faire 
idea that that government governs best which governs least, it does not 
necessarily follow therefrom that the individual citizen no longer 
needs the protection of a constitution in order to preserve and enjoy his 
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liberty. A great public service might be rendered if the whole subject 
were investigated in an impartial and scientific way. A good deal of the 
writing that we have had has been done in order to establish and sustain 
a specific thesis. One would have about as much difficulty in saying that 
Mr. Willis was an impartial observer as he would have in saying that 
Lord Hewart approached the whole question in a judicial manner. 
I conceive it to be a part of Mr. Cook's plan that the school of research 
to be created upon this Campus should render just such a service to the 
country. I see no reason why a scientific and scholarly study of the whole 
subject may not be made although it must of necessity deal with a matter 
that is somewhat controversial and is even now in a transitional stage. 
The change, however, is not so rapid that it may not be observed and 
its trend established. 
It  is not my thought that such an investigation should be undertaken 
for the purpose of enabling us to retrace our steps and so form the basis 
of a regressive movement. My thought is rather that the investigation 
and appraisal should be made in order that we may determine how far 
we have proceeded, for what reason and with what effect. In dealing 
with matters concerning human relations whether legal or social, we 
are obliged to start from where we are. There does not appear to be, at 
least on the part of the public or even on the part of the legal profession 
as a whole, an awareness of the extent of the departure which has already 
been made from the body of doctrine known as the separation of 
powers. In order that we may be able to take the next necessary step 
intelligently and in the right direction, we must first know where we 
stand, otherwise we step in the dark. If it be assumed that the doctrine 
had validity in the beginning; that it was evolved as a matter of ex­
perience in government extending over millenniums; that i t  was intended 
to set limits to the universal tendency of human beings who have power 
to endeavor to acquire more power; that an observance of the doctrine 
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in principle at least is necessary to a preservation of individual liberty; 
then it follows that such an investigation as is proposed would be of the 
highest value. It may be that such an appraisal might not be accepted or 
considered by the public at large. It would , however, be accepted and 
considered by those in positions of leadership and this, I take it, was at 
least a part of Mr. Cook's plan. 
In practice written constitutions have one great defect so far as public 
opinion is concerned. People at large regard a political principle em­
bodied in a constitution as self-sustaining and self-enforcing and for the 
most part so our constitutions were in the beginning. But we have 
gradually grown away from the conditions which produced the con­
stitution and the experiences which prompted us to write these political 
principles into the constitution. As a people we forget that we once 
suffered all abuses of governmental power set forth in the declaration of 
independence and we therefore look with tolerance upon departures 
from constitutional principles. We have no immediate experience which 
emphasizes to the public mind the reasons for and the importance of a 
particular principle although we may be about to acquire some such 
experience. Thus a proposal at the present time to limit the right of 
trial by jury or of free speech is not met in the same spirit with which it 
would have been met a hundred years ago. While it is not fashionable 
at the present moment to do so, it would be helpful if we would more 
frequently recall the fact that what we have achieved in the way of 
personal liberty and self government has cost not only "much toil and 
not a little blood " but centuries of time. It may be as Mr. Cook said 
in his letter to the Lawyers Club that there has been infused into our 
population a large element of recent immigrants who have different 
standards, that they are without appreciation of Anglo-Saxon institu­
tions and the concept of law as it has been developed on American soil, 
and that the influence of this group has resulted in a weakening of the 
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ideals of individual liberty held by the Anglo-Saxons from the time of 
King Alfred. If this observation be true it affords an additional reason 
for a revival of an interest in the fundamental political concepts which 
underlie our law. If the present generation is to preserve and maintain 
these ideals they must as a whole know what they are and must appre­
ciate their present practical political value. It is as true today as in the 
days of Patrick Henry that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. 
Unless we are vigilant to preserve our liberties, we may find as did 
Esau that we have parted with our birthright for a mess of pottage. 
Address 
By NEWTON D .  BAKER 
Of the Cleveland Bar1 Secretary of War1 1916-1921 
DEAN Bates, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen: I doubt whether anybody outside of the immediate family felt so keen a sense of personal loss in the death of Queen Vic­
toria as I. For a long time prior to that event, I had been of the persua­
sion that she and I were the last of the Victorians and when she died I 
felt isolated and alone. 
I am well aware of the fact that it is the common custom nowadays 
to think of the Victorians and to judge that great queen with reference 
to the particular style of hat which she affected, but as a matter of fact, 
a great case can be made for the Victorian Era. 
Surely no poetry written since Victoria's death can compare with 
that written during her reign. I know no English prose written since 
that time which is either nobler in content or more classically precise 
in form than that of Matthew Arnold and Cardinal Newman, or more 
rich in color and emotion than that of John Ruskin. The liberation of 
philosophical thinking which took place in that era, largely through 
Huxley's superb exposition of Darwin's theories and hypotheses, is as 
bold a departure and as brilliant a performance as the world has had 
since Newton elaborated his laws. In political theory and in the develop­
ment of legal institutions, English history throughout Victoria's sixty 
years is full of outstanding achievements. It took Charles Dickens to 
paint the picture of the necrosis which had overtaken chancery pro­
cedure, but the great lawyers of Victoria's time reformed the Chancery 
94 
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and other courts of England until English justice became, and has re­
mained, the model of the modern world for integrity, learning, inde­
pendence and the expeditious determination of human rights. 
In a larger view it is also to be remembered that the Victorian Era 
put an end to the inanities of the four Georges, and that during that 
time, the genius of the English people made a world wide empire, 
governed with a higher degree of wisdom and success than has been seen 
since the Vandals and the Visigoths entered Rome. And their genius 
has persevered until, in our own day, in a quiet and orderly fashion, 
without revolution, indeed without apparent strain, we have seen the 
great British Empire converted into a commonwealth of independent 
democracies, each preserving for itself and for the aggregate of which 
it is a member, most of the ideals, political and personal, upon which 
the liberties of the Englishman have grown. It is the orderly progress of 
this development which tonight I select for emphasis. At every stage it 
has seemed to be the natural and normal expansion of existing ideas and 
institutions, and during all of it there has been tremendous loyalty to 
the great fundamental and underlying principles which the British have 
nowhere summed up, but which in their aggregate go by the name of 
the British Constitution. If there has been any tendency to depart from 
these underlying assumptions, it is chiefly in the matter on which Judge 
Rosenberry has so profoundly spoken tonight. Indeed, I had it in my 
mind to discuss somewhat the separation of powers, but he has done it 
with a degree of thoroughness which makes any addition from me on 
that subject unnecessary. I tha'nk him for what he has done, both be­
cause of my deep sympathy with his view and because it frees me to 
take up something else which I equally want to say. 
Judge Rosenberry has pointed out that when the Constitution was 
written, the two books which were consulted most by members of the 
Constitutional Convention and the great group of lawyers and politi-
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cians who surrounded it were Montesquieu and John Locke. Mon­
tesquieu was a young Frenchman of noble parentage. As a youth, he 
became a lawyer and a member of the Parliament of Bordeaux. He 
appears to have taken little interest in the practice of law, but he 
devoted his entire life to the study of legal institutions both as he saw 
them in operation about him and as he could read of them in history. 
He went to England and lived there three years, coming back to France 
with the idea which always after remained the cornerstone of his 
institutional philosophy-the necessity for separation of governmental 
powers. Some critics have said that Montesquieu found in England 
what was not there, that the English themselves had no such sense of 
the value of the idea, but Montesquieu thought he found it and he gave 
twenty years of continuous labor to it. Certainly the modern world re­
gards his " Spirit of Laws" as the contribution of a new political idea, 
and that idea became one of the foundation stones of American con­
stitutional theory and democratic belief. 
The Constitution of the United States was, of course, written and 
started on its way years before the beginning of the Victorian Era in 
England, but during that era great things took place in this country and 
it does not stretch the historical perspective to regard the growth of 
British institutions during the reign of Victoria as analogous to and 
substantially contemporaneous with the development of our own con­
stitutional theory. Certainly the non-revolutionary method of progress 
was the same in both. 
The effort of the American Colonies to establish their independence 
was an indigenous democratic movement. In the pre-revolutionary 
literature, one does not find any sense of solidarity among the American 
Colonies or any desire to establish a new country. Each of the colonies 
was restless t,mder some grievance or restraint which it desired to shake 
off, and about the only common cause the colonies were able to make 
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was against alien and overseas rule, rather than in favor of a new 
American confederation on the basis of common interest. The people 
and their colonial governments were separatist and independent. Their 
local laws were frequently published in books entitled " Liberties and 
Laws." Indeed, there seemed to be a competition among the colonies to 
see which could state most alluringly the number of liberties and rights 
retained or vindicated by the members of their respective common­
wealths. The political philosophers of the country, consisting of the 
lawyers, preachers, and the very extraordinary group of reading and 
thinking farmers, had each their several theories as to how the demo­
cratic spirit which surrounded them could be given institutional form. 
Plans to create a government were proportionately as many and as 
various as plans in recent years to end the depression. Out of this seeth­
ing mass of suggestions, three principal theories emerged which can be 
described best by association with three great colonial names. 
John Adams needs a biographer. To most school boys he appears as a 
bit of a fuss-budget, but he was in reality a very great man as well as a 
very great patriot, and in spite of the futility of the Committee on 
Correspondence, and the somewhat pathetic vanities of his presidency, 
he believed in democracy. Adams thought, however, that an enduring 
democracy could only be established by providing that the majority of 
the people should be the beneficiaries and that a cultured few at the 
top, filled with unselfish aims and noble ideas and having all the ad­
vantages of education and tested character, should look after the affairs 
of the people for them. 
Alexander Hamilton, who came of different stock, probably did not 
believe in a democracy of any kind. Indeed he was not much interested 
in forms of government. His idea was that the country would and 
should be governed by its commercial interests. He foresaw expanding 
commerce and advancing industry, and believed that we should have 
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institutions which would advance the prosperity of the whole country 
by bringing the interests of business men into control in matters of 
policy. 
Thomas Jefferson, by the way, also needs a biographer. He alone 
believed in a democracy in which all individuals participated in power 
and participated in the decisions of governmental policy. There is no 
more strange and variegated figure in our history. He had singular limi­
tations and equally amazing grasp and prophetic instinct and faith. It is 
said that he had in a drawer in his desk at Monticello the constitutions 
of one hundred democracies established in times earlier than his own, 
all of which had failed. There was not then in the world an existing 
democracy, yet Jefferson dared believe that there could be a successful 
democracy in this country in which everyone would be a participant in 
political power. We heard this afternoon some quotations from Jeffer­
son which showed, however, the limitations of his faith. He dreaded 
the intervention of commercial and industrial interests. One of our 
speakers this afternoon quoted him as describing America by saying, 
"We are an agricultural people. There is little commerce and almost no 
manufacturing among us, and I pray God it will be a long time before 
there is much of either." He believed that a society of the simple sort 
we then had could acquire enough general education and give enough 
attention to public affairs to make democracy work as a form of govern­
ment, but the distortion caused by active commercial interests and the 
congested wage earning populations which he had seen in the industrial 
cities of the Old World introduced elements of danger which were 
beyond his faith. 
No really deliberate choice was made among these different theories. 
Washington's administration was primarily Hamiltonian. Jefferson's 
administration was something less than Jeffersonian. The Constitution 
itself, with its checks and balances and its Venetian method of presi-
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dential election responded rather more to the theory of Adams than to 
either of the others. 
In later periods emphasis has shifted sometimes in one direction and 
sometimes in another, but through it all, and in the Victorian Era in 
America, the Supreme Court of the United States, took the Constitu­
tion founded on Montesquieu and Locke, based upon the evolution of 
English institutions, and, in decision after decision, established great 
landmarks of liberty and freedom until in the end we have come to re­
gard this as a flexible democracy so far as form is concerned, but in 
substance fixing certain rights and privileges which the humblest citizen 
in the land may with confidence assert no matter how haughty or how 
powerful the opposing powers may be. 
You may recall that Gladstone, whom we delight to quote on the 
American Constitution, said that the American Constitution was the 
greatest document ever struck off at one time by the mind of man, but 
at the same time, and in a part of the same sentence which we rarely hear 
quoted, he said that the British was the greatest constitution that had 
ever grown and evolved out of the experience of the people. Both 
peoples really had the same idea. On our side of the water we deemed it 
better to write it down, perhaps fancying we might then more safely 
leave it to shift for itself, while the British have preferred to make 
watchfulness an assurance against encroachment or unauthorized change. 
The point I want to bring out is that in both countries the genius of 
successful democracy has been to institutionalize the experience of the 
race-rather to make trial and error the guide and teacher than pure 
theory or emotional invention. Dr. Jacks, who was principal at Man­
chester College at Oxford, once said that the value of the study of 
history is that it keeps us from letting our buckets down into wells 
which have long since gone dry. That is the negative statement of it. 
The method of our growth is the demonstration of the fact that the 
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experience of the race is in the long view wiser than the spontaneous 
brilliance of any generation. It is in this light that both the Victorian 
Era in England and the Constitutional Era in the United States seem to 
plead for education as the preservative of our liberties-education which 
will enable us to be quite certain that we are neither attempting un­
remembered failures; nor, on the other hand, embarking upon fanciful 
courses which do not rest for their promise on the nature and the 
character of the people among whom they are to be applied. 
When the World War was fought, we persuaded ourselves that it was 
fought for the purpose of making the world safe for democracy. Some 
people said it was fought to make democracy safe for the world. It does 
not seem to me to matter much which view is taken. The fact is that 
immediately the war was over, peoples everywhere with one accord 
cast out kings, emperors and oligarchies and joyously applied them­
selves to the creation of democratic forms of government. The air was 
filled with new constitutions. Conventions and constitutional assem­
blies met where only royal diets had met before, and constitutions 
appeared where once only imperial prescripts had been permitted. Prac­
tically all the countries in the western world announced themselves as 
democracies ready for business, elected their representatives, and 
expected the millennium. 
In a pathetically short while, it began to appear that things were not 
going so well. All the woes of a devastating war, all the tensions of new 
international relations, all the pitfalls and perils of new-found emanci­
pations began to assail them. One after another of these peoples have 
presented this spectacle to the world, that after having embarked on a 
democracy, they have sought out a Lenin, a Hitler, or a Mussolini and 
have said to them, ''This is too complicated and difficult for us: you do 
it." Now why have they done this? It seems to me that the answer is 
clear. They have done it because they learned by bitter experience that 
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though democracy is the best form of government in the world, it is 
altogether the most difficult form to operate. These peoples came 
suddenly to a realization that they had not been trained to operate a 
democracy; that they did not have the patience; that they did not have 
the knowledge; that they did not realize that successful democracy is a 
growth and not a gift. They wanted some instantaneous Alladin' s lamp 
process to change from imperialism to democracy, only to find that 
democracies do not come that way. So we find all the world over that 
democracy as a form of government has come into dispraise. Mussolini, 
and I have no reason to doubt his sincerity, has spoken in withering 
contempt of it. The Russian and German experiments have discarded 
the whole theory in favor of regimentation, control, and coercion. In­
deed it can be fairly said that democracy today survives only in the 
English speaking and certain Scandinavian countries where it has grown 
as a practice, while it has failed in every country which has sought to 
attempt the ready-made by imitating or aspiring to the success else­
where achieved. 
Now one or the other of two things is going to happen. Either democ­
racy is going to regain its lost place in the affections of men, or it is 
going to lose out universally; and it is for this reason that it seems to me 
of tragic importance that we people of the United States and of England, 
who have learned the process by which democracy is created and pre­
served, shall persevere along the lines which experience has taught us is 
the true law of institutional growth. 
I said a moment ago that democracy is the hardest of all forms of 
government to operate and it daily grows harder. The things which 
government has to do nowadays, as Judge Rosenberry has just said, 
are not so simple as they were in Jefferson's day. Science strides ahead 
with seven league boots, and invention carries research into practical 
application with increasing rapidity. Meantime, some of the atmos-
Ul
 
!-<
 
u.J
 
u.J
 
�
 
!-<
 
Ul
 
u.J
 
0
 
�
 
z
 
0
 
�
 
0
 
z
 
<(
 
u.J
 
!-<<(!-< 
Ul
 
�
 
u.J
 
z
 
�
 
0uz
 
�
 
u.J
 
!-<
 
Ul
 
u.J
 
�
 
I
 
!-<
 
::
:::> 
0Ul
 
c5
 
N
 
N
 
�
 
0
 
0
 
�
 
� 0 0 � Ul Ul <( .....J u .i .....J <( I Ul z S: u !-< :::::> I 
104 Dedicatory Exercises 
phere of Jeffersonian democracy has become distinctly Hamiltonian. 
Both our domestic and our world relations are changing and all these 
things multiply the problems of government. 
Jefferson's idea was that a democracy of his type was possible only 
because it required an amount of popular education which was within 
the reach. of everybody. As he grew older, his thought dwelt more and 
more upon the University of Virginia and the institutions of higher 
learning then being established in the country. Plainly he already saw the 
need for more education than he had at one time assumed would be neces­
sary if the verdict of the electorate was to be a safe reliance for liberty. 
If Jefferson were alive now, he would believe this even more intensely. 
It used to be, even in my lifetime, that when young men received college 
diplomas they remained educated men, but now the increase of knowl­
edge and the increased complication of affairs comes so fast that to stop 
learning for a day is to begin to be an uneducated man, and we are com­
ing more and more to see that continuous education, sometimes 
called adult education, is the only salvation of democratic institutions, 
and I think we are also quite clear now that there must be specialists 
among us. Nobody who tries to know everything, knows much of 
anything. A certain irreducible minimum of common education we can 
have and I, myself, place that minimum much above mere literacy, but 
there must be leadership and specialized training in selected groups and 
humility enough in the rest of us to be willing to be led and informed 
by those selected to be specialists in particular matters. 
Having these views, it is natural that I should rejoice in Mr. Cook's 
benevolence to this institution which is not merely training lawyers, 
but producing scholarly research in the law. And I think history will 
record some day that there was a providential inspiration about the 
selection of this place for this great institution. This is the Middle 
West or the Near East as you may see fit to call it. In the spirit of the 
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Middle West that vital thing called "Americanism" has long found its 
stoutest defenders. Frederick Turner's epoch making contribution to 
the written history of America shows the influence of the frontier. 
Without that pioneer spirit which moved west with Daniel Boone, 
Kenton, and others, it may very well be that our country's history 
would have presented a totally different picture and our country's unity 
would have been impossible to maintain. I was not born in this Middle 
West and so I do not praise my ancestors when I say that a detached 
observer in Mars during the last hundred years would probably always 
have put his finger upon the Middle West as the spot that most 
thoroughly and truly exemplified America. Now again in the Middle 
West is established what bids fair to be the greatest law institution in 
the world. It is superbly equipped and has every incitement to scholarly 
research. The place and the thing it does are a call to patriotism and 
leadership, and in the future it will bring from all over the United 
States the ripest and most thoughtful scholars we have to take up such 
research as Judge Rosenberry called for tonight-research which trys to 
find out what we are really seeking and what we have to pay to get it. 
If I have seemed to you tonight to stress unduly individual liberty 
and freedom, if I have appeared to you to be a rugged individualist, I 
shall not be abashed at the phrase. It is as clear to me as it is to you that 
as life becomes more complicated and congested, we must surrender 
more and more of our individual rights for the common good, but I do 
not want to surrender one jot or tittle of these rights without knowing 
what I am to get in return for it and that it is worth the sacrifice. We 
must know it, not gu�ss at it. We must not be willing to make these 
surrenders because somebody speaks in a loud voice or arouses an emo­
tional atmosphere. When the surrender is asked, those who ask it must 
have knowledge upon which to base their request. 
One of the most brilliant and most delightful of the young gentlemen 
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in Washington was reported in a newspaper the other day as saying that 
there are people in the United States who are unaccountably, even 
fanatically, devoted to the Constitution. I was not vain enough to think 
this was a personal reference, but I am very happy to be sure that there 
is at least one such person in the United States. 
I believe in the Constitution. No doubt some part of my belief is my 
birthright, that controlling complex of emotions and traditions which 
surround us from our cradle to our maturity, but by far the larger part 
of the basis of my belief is what the Constitution has in fact done. It 
has made for the world for the first time in history a great and success­
ful democracy. It does not assume to be unchangeable like the laws of 
the Medes and Persians. It provides how it is to be amended, and my 
prayer is that we may not see it amended while we are assembling the 
evidence. This was all that Mr. Cook had in his mind. He did not build 
this school to crystallize, but to study. He hoped that it would minister 
to the preservation of American institutions. That preservation will best 
come from the knowledge which this, as a research institution, can dis­
seminate to inspire us to the possibility of our growth in the future as 
we have grown in the past and to dissuade us from the rash and heady 
experiments which the experience of the race has shown to be illusions. 
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